Tax Exempt Financing of Health Care Facilities as a Component of the Market Approach to Health Care Cost Containment by King, George A.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 11 | Number 3 Article 6
1983
Tax Exempt Financing of Health Care Facilities as a
Component of the Market Approach to Health
Care Cost Containment
George A. King
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
George A. King, Tax Exempt Financing of Health Care Facilities as a Component of the Market Approach to Health Care Cost Containment,
11 Fordham Urb. L.J. 603 (1983).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol11/iss3/6
TAX EXEMPT FINANCING OF HEALTH CARE
FACILITIES AS A COMPONENT OF THE
MARKET APPROACH TO HEALTH CARE COST
CONTAINMENT
I. Introduction
The upward spiral of medical care costs' is a persistent national
problem. The rate of inflation in the health care field has exceeded the
overall Consumer Price Index for three decades. 2 The failure of cost
containment attempts has resulted in an increase in the percentage of
disposable income a taxpayer must now spend on health care ex-
penses. 3 Stubborn health care inflation has buoyed the rise of the
Consumer Price Index, thereby increasing expenditures tied to the
Index, 4 including those not related to health care. 5 Consequently, the
1. The Internal Revenue Code defines medical care as the "amounts paid: (A)
for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body, (B) for transportation
primarily for and essential to medical care referred to in subparagraph (A), or (C) for
insurance (including amounts paid as premiums under part B of title XVIII of the
Social Security Act, relating to supplementary medical insurance for the aged) cover-
ing medical care referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B)." I.R.C. § 213 (e)(1)
(1976) (redesignated as § 213(d)(1) for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1983.
I.R.C. § 213 (West Supp. 1982)).
2. Schramm, A State-Based Approach To Hospital Cost Containment, 18 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 603, 606 (1981) (chart compares annual increases of the Consumer Price
Index to the health care component of the Index); Pear, Health Care Costs Up 11 %,
Nearly Triple Inflation Rate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1983, at A8, col. 1. In 1982,
health care costs rose 11% and the overall Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 3.9%.
id.; Freeland & Schendler, National Health Care Expenditures: Short-Term Outlook
and Long-Term Projections, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Winter 1981, at 112.
Health care expenditures have increased in percentage terms at a faster rate than the
Gross National Product (GNP) for every measured period since 1950. As a percentage
of the GNP, health expenditures have risen from 4.4% in 1950 to 5.3% in 1960 to
7.6% in 1970. The increases continued in the last decade with an 8.6% rating in
1975 and a 9% rating in 1979. Projections are that the percentage will continue to
climb through the 1980's, passing 9.9% in 1985 and 10.8% in 1990. Id.
3. Schramm, supra note 2, at 607 (health care expenditures accounted for 4 %
of disposable income in 1950, 6.5% in 1965 and 17% in 1978).
4. Stevenson, Financing Not for Profit Organizations, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
FINANCE 401 (1980). Even in the context of a slower rate of inflation and a slight
Consumer Price Index increase of 0.3% in August 1982, medical costs continued to
rise more rapidly at a rate of 0.9 % for the same period. In the twelve month period
ending in August 1982, medical costs were up 11.4 %. The CPI for the same period
was up 5.9 %. Fuerbringer, Consumer Index In Modest Rise: 0.3 % in August, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 24, 1982, at Al, col. 1. In September, the trend continued with a CPI
increase of 0.2% and an increase in medical costs of 0.9%. Medical costs were the
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government's historical emphasis on providing access to health care"
has been supplemented by fiscal concern. 7 Moreover, the political
difficulty in reaching a consensus on health policy has resulted in
only component of the Index which was still rising at double digit annual rates as of
the September figures. Fuerbringer, Consumers' Prices Up 0.2 % in Month; House
Costs Down, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6. The pattern continued in
October, Cowan, U.S. Price Index Up By 0.5% in October; Area's Rise at 1.5%,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1982, at Al, col. 6 (medical care costs up 0.8%), and Novem-
ber, November Consumer Prices Up By 0.1%, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1982, at D6,
col. I (medical care costs up 1%; hospital room charges up 1.5%). During the
calendar year 1982, health care costs rose 11% while the overall CPI rose 3.9%.
Pear, supra note 2.
5. Johnson, Consumer Price Index, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 186, 188
(D. Greenwald ed. 1982). The CPI measures price changes of goods and services. Id.
at 186. The CPI is widely used as an adjustment measure in wage contracts, interest
payments and social transfers. Id. at 188. To the extent health care costs increase the
overall CPI, they cause inflation in these non-health expenditures.
6. Principal examples of this concern are (1) the Hill-Burton Act, see Comment,
The Hill Burton Act, 1946-1980: Asynchrony in the Delivery of Health Care to the
Poor, 39 MD. L. REV. 316 (1979), (2) Medicare, insurance for the aged under the
Social Security Act, Social Security Amendments of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976)
and (3) Medicaid, the jointly sponsored federal and state program providing medical
aid for persons whose income is below a specified level, Social Security Amendments
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
7. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law, A Structural Ap-
proach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 286-303 (1978) (state level cutbacks on Medicaid); Wing &
Silton, Constitutional Authority for Extending Federal Control Over The Delivery of
Health Care, 57 N.C.L. REV. 1423, 1431-32 (1979) (review of different cost proposals
offered during the 95th Congress). The Reagan Administration has indicated that it
supports a competitive resolution to the problem of health care costs. Address by
Secretary of Health and Human Services Richard Schweiker, American Hospital
Association (Feb. 2, 1981), cited in Galblum & Triger, Demonstrations of Alternative
Delivery Systems Under Medicare and Medicaid, in HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV.,
Mar. 1982, at 1.
Concerns for price as well as access have been reflected in the testing of competi-
tion claims using Medicare and Medicaid test programs. These programs examined
the application of alternative health care systems to the needs of Medicare and
Medicaid patients. Galblum & Triger, supra, at 1. The surge in health care as a
component of the GNP and the impact of the price increases in the industry have
attracted prominent attention in the press. Stevens, High Medical Costs Under
Attack As Drain On The Nation's Economy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
Alexander McMahon, President of the American Hosp. Association, described the
costs of medical care as intolerable and stated that the strong opinion in government
and business circles is that costs are going to be controlled in one way or another,
either through competition or regulation. The alternative of maintaining the status
quo and the annual increase in costs is not seen as viable. Id. See also Duncan, What's
Next On Health Cost Control, NATION'S Bus., Nov. 1982, at 22, 27 (alternative
policies stressing competition will succeed only when rising costs force legislators to
choose between competition and substantially greater government intervention such
as National Health Insurance).
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government actions which redistribute health expenses rather than
resolve the cost crisis. 8
Commentators have responded to these fiscal concerns by focusing
on the objectives of conserving and apportioning the amount of public
funding allocated to health care and curbing inflation in health care
costs. 9 Commentators in the health care industry and government
officials, however, have not reached a consensus on how to achieve
these goals. 10 There is agreement that the current health care delivery
system encourages price increases."' A significant change in structure
is needed to achieve an economically viable balance of health care
quality, access, equity, and cost considerations. 12
8. A provision in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, included a provision which reduced Medicare expenses by
$350 million in 1982 and $530 million in 1983. The plan, however, merely switched
the burden to the private sector by requiring employers of 20 or more workers to
include those between the ages of 65 and 69 in their group health plans unless the
employee specifically chooses to use Medicare as his principle insurance. A New
Health Tab for Business, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 20, 1982, at 49. Some businesses fear the
program may be extended to retirees 65 and over. Id. Others identify this provision as
an emerging trend to shift medical charges from government to companies and
individuals without solving the cost problem. Duncan, supra note 7, at 22.
9. Blumstein & Sloan, Redefining Government's Role in Health Care: Is a Dose
Of Competition What The Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L, REV. 849, 852 (1981).
The authors identify the two objectives of conservation and apportionment as central
to establishing market incentives. See Schramm, supra note 2, at 641 (stressing that
changes in health care financing are necessary for a long term containment pro-
gram). See generally REGULATING HEALTH CARE, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL (A.
Levin ed. 1980). This book is a collection of essays 6y contributors from government
and the health care field. It recognizes the wide range of issues affected by health
care costs including legislation, regulation, components of costs, competition theo-
ries, and imposed controls.
10. Levin, The Search for New Forms of Control, in REGULATING HEALTH CARE,
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 1, 5 (A. Levin ed. 1980) (recent debate over types of
regulation is being replaced with proposals for non-regulatory forms of policy imple-
mentation); Duncan, supra note 7, at 27 (the eventual policy choice will be competi-
tion or substantial government intervention); Stevens, supra note 7 (current health
policy is not acceptable).
11. Freeland & Schendler, supra note 2, at 126. As the percentage of health care
paid by insurance increases, consumers tend to view health care services as "free." In
addition, providers are reimbursed for increased levels of services. The current
system does not reward innovative delivery processes which are associated with
increased productivity and lower costs. Id. See generally notes 2 & 4 supra (statistics
on price increases).
12. Shapiro, Learning to set a limit on health care, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 14, 1983, at
20. Irving Shapiro has proposed a national commission on health care to recommend
structural changes to address these problems. Id.; Cook, Why Medical Care Costs
Are Out of Control, An interview with Michael Bromberg, FORBES, Feb. 28, 1983, at
104 (Executive Director of the Federation of American Hospitals notes that the
health care system must be designed to provide incentives to limit cost increases).
606 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
The Market Approach and other procompetition theories have been
offered as a solution to the health care cost dilemma. 13 The Market
Approach encourages consumer desire for decreasing health costs'
4
and suggests new cost saving incentives. One faction of Market Ap-
proach proponents suggests that individuals rather than insurance
companies should shoulder a greater burden of medical costs as a
necessary means to encourage patients to consider cost containment
when using the health care system.' 5 Another faction focuses on the
increased use of marketplace competition between traditional health
providers and innovative, less expensive alternative delivery systems. 16
13. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 849-926 (explanation of Market Ap-
proach theory and development); Pollard, Fostering Competition in Health Care, in
REGULATING HEALTH CARE, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 159 (A. Levin ed. 1980)
(describing Market Approach concepts as competition theory); Schramm, supra note
2, at 603-78 (offering a model statute which promotes competition as a cost contain-
ment mechanism).
14. The current tax subsidy for insurance and the third party payment system do
not encourage consumer concern for health costs and have been cited as the major
disincentives to cost consciousness. Duncan, supra note 7, at 23. The insurance
benefits are tax free income for the employee and tax deductible expenses for the
employer. I.R.C. § 106 (1976) ("Gross income does not include contributions by the
employer to accident or health plans for compensation (through insurance or other-
wise) to his employees for personal injuries or sickness"). I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1976 &
West Supp. 1982) provides a method for a business to deduct health insurance
premiums under the concept of "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compen-
sation for personal services actually rendered." I.R.C. § 162(i) (West Supp. 1982)
limits distinctions among employees covered by a Group Health Plan (discrimination
against persons with end stage renal disease is prohibited). Jan Peter Ozga, Health
Care Director for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, has stated that third party
payment through insurance has encouraged excessive costs on all levels.
Doctors and hospitals are only too glad to provide this care. Insurance
companies are happy to write the coverage. Employees, especially those in
unions, demand more and more health benefits. And employers, who are
eager to attract and retain labor and are given a tax subsidy to provide
health benefits, do so willingly.
Ozga, quoted in Duncan, supra note 7, at 23. See Freeland & Schlender, supra note
2, at 126 (consumers perceive insured health care as "free"). See also Greenspan &
Vogel, Taxation and Its Effect Upon Public and Private Health Insurance and
Medical Demand, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring 1980, at 39 (arguing that
tax subsidies for insurance raise the price of health care); Cook, supra note 12, at 104
(Executive Director of the Federation of American Hospitals says there are no normal
market restrictions on health insurance because the tax laws make health insurance
free for both the employer and the employee). President Reagan has proposed a new
tax on health insurance provided by employers as part of the Administration's com-
prehensive plan to control health costs. Pear, Reagans Budget Will Seek To Tax
Health Premiums, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
15. See note 141 infra. For a complete discussion of the Market Approach, see
notes 136-62 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 142-43 infra. For a comparison of the two factions, see notes 140-45
infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of alternative delivery systems, see
notes 39-52 infra and accompanying text.
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The latter group states that alternative systems which can offer lower
costs will force prices down toward the minimum necessary level as
they attract the business of individual patients and group insurance
plans which previously utilized other more expensive providers.17
Theories based on a competitive model of the health care system are
useful in studying the health care industry. Specific proposals, how-
ever, are necessary to make the Market Approach a practical policy
alternative.' 8 One such proposal includes the use of targeted tax ex-
empt financing to establish the competitive forces which are the basis
of the Market Approach.' 9
Three principal themes contribute to the attractiveness of tax ex-
empt financing for alternative delivery systems as a means to intro-
duce competitive economic principles to the health care system. First,
from an investor's viewpoint, health care facilities are unattractive
investment opportunities. 20 The introduction of tax exempt status for
the investment is a powerful equalizer in the competition for investor
capital.2 ' Second, the health care industry requires large capital ex-
17. See Lindsey, California Seeks To Cut Cost Of Health Care With Bidding,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1983, at Al, col. 5. California recently adopted such an
approach, initiating competitive bidding in awarding contracts to hospitals and
doctors to treat the private patients covered by insurance companies. Similar ar-
rangements are being made in the case of indigents who receive state aid for medical
costs. Id.
18. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 891 (noting that Market Approach
theories, like many planning goals, are "long on aspiration but short on implementa-
tion"). But see Schramm, supra note 2, at 641. Schramm has proposed a plan for
implementing his cost containment proposals. He advocates short run government
intervention through the medium of his model statute while stressing that over the
long term, only fundamental reform in health care financing can stimulate competi-
tion and cost awareness. Id. By May, 1982, 17 states had passed a form of cost
containment legislation. See Esposito, Hopfer, Mason & Rogler, Abstracts of State
Legislated Hospital Cost Containment Programs, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV.,
Dec. 1982, at 129 (summarizes the principal characteristics of each state program).
See also Duncan, supra note 7, at 23-24 (the Reagan Administration is currently
formulating a health care cost containment proposal).
19. This Comment makes such a proposal. See notes 300-54 infra and accompa-
nying text.
20. See STATE OF OHIO HOSPITAL IMPROVEMENT REVENUE BONDS (The Cleveland
Clinic Project), OFFICIAL STATEMENT (June 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as STATE OF
OHIO HOSPITAL IMPROVEMENT REVENUE BONDS (The Cleveland Clinic Project)]. Even
established health facilities are a risky investment. Id. at 16-19.
21. HEALTH CARE FINANCING STUDY GROUP, THE USES AND IMPACTS OF HOSPITAL
TAX EXEMPT FINANCING 18 (May 1982) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH CARE FINANCING
STUDY GROUP]. In the most general sense, interest rates for taxable hospital bonds are
estimated to be two to five percent higher than tax exempt rates. Id. See PUBLIC
SECURITIES ASSOCIATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 8 (1980) (comparison
chart of municipal bond and corporate bond yields for 1970-1979).
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penditures. Alternative delivery systems cannot merely lease a store-
front and commence operation. Equipment, labor and insurance costs
are high. Moreover, future expenditures for upgrading facilities and
equipment must be considered before entering the health care mar-
ket." Therefore, alternative health care facilities need the economic
stimulus which tax exempt financing will provide. Third, the industry
traditionally has received assistance in developing health facilities
from philanthrophic sources, religious orders and educational institu-
tions.23 However, the government has assumed a major role since
World War II, replacing declining gifts with government sponsored
financial support. 24 Only recently have health care facilities competed
in the municipal bond market for capital. 25 The use of tax exempt
financing is a manifestation of traditional government financial assist-
ance for health care facilities.
Alternative delivery systems are an essential component of a Market
Approach to health care cost containment. They are viewed as a
competitive alternative to the current delivery system rather than a
total replacement for it.2 6 Yet to be effective, they must have access to
The exemption increases the effective rate of return on an investment. To calculate
the taxable equivalent of a tax free bond, divide the tax exempt yield (e.g., 10 %) by
the number resulting from 100% minus the marginal tax bracket (e.g., 100%-
50 % = 50 %). Therefore, 10 % divided by 50 % equals a 20 % taxable yield equiva-
lent. See id. at 7-9.
22. Koenig, Big Concerns Take An Interest In Fast Growing Clinical Labs, Wall
St. J., Apr. 30, 1982, at 33, col. I (start-up expenses of laboratories are making it
impossible for small companies to compete). See HEALTH CARE FINANCING STUDY
Gnoup, supra note 21, at 36 (innovative organization of health care institutions and
new modes of patient care have been cited as contributing to large capital needs).
23. Philanthropy provided the primary source of capital for hospital financing
before World War II. Bradford, Caldwell & Goldsmith, The Hospital Capital Crisis:
Issues for Trustees, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 56 [hereinafter cited as The
Hospital Capital Crisis]; Hilferty, Capital Financing for Hospitals: The New York
Experience, 57 N.C.L. REV. 1383, 1385 n.9 (1979). See generally HEALTH CARE
FINANCING STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 6 (philanthropy has continued to decline
as a source of funding for hospital construction, accounting for 10.4% of such
funding in 1973 and 6.2% in 1978).
24. The Hospital Capital Crisis, supra note 23, at 56. The Great Depression and
World War II disrupted the capital accumulation of the hospital industry. The Hill-
Burton Program was the congressional response to the deficiency of private funds. Id.
See note 6 supra (examples of government support).
25. The Hospital Capital Crisis, supra note 23, at 57. Government programs
were not seen as requiring supplemental funding sources until the late 1960's and
early 1970's. Tax exempt financing authorities were created at that time to issue
revenue bonds. Id.
26. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 894 (some form of regulation would be
retained in a Market Approach, but its role would be limited to facilitating competi-
tive goals rather than dictating the structure of the health care market). See generally
608 [Vol. XI
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the same advantages that their established competition enjoys. Tax
exempt financing is an existing vehicle which may be used to encour-
age the entry of specific alternative providers into the health care
marketplace.
This Comment will discuss the current health delivery system in the
context of a Market Approach to health care cost containment. Politi-
cal and financial issues in health care as well as current judicial and
tax policies affecting Market Approach theory will be examined. The
Comment concludes that targeted tax exempt financing must play a,
major role in establishing competitive forces in the health care deliv-
ery system.
II. The Health Care Environment
The health care system in the United States has achieved great
success. The average life expectancy of Americans has risen steadily.
27
Diseases such as pneumonia, influenza, tuberculosis and gastritis,
which accounted for about one-third of all deaths in the United States
in 1900, were nearly eliminated as causes of death by 1976.28 In
addition, the vast majority of Americans suffer no disability which
impairs their regular activities. 29 There are some areas, however, such
as the successful treatment of circulatory disease, where American
health achievements trail those of other countries by substantial mar-
gins.30 Nevertheless, a majority of American adults are engaging in
Pollard, supra note 13, at 158-59 (controls on market forces would be appropriate to
protect the interests of the poor and the aged).
27. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
HEALTH: UNITED STATES 1981, at 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH: UNITED
STATES 1981]. The average life expectancy in 1979 was 73.8 years. Id.; Good News,
Bad News Again, Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1980, at 8, col. 1. The average life expectancy
in 1900 was 47 years. Id.
28. Percent of All Deaths, by Specified Causes of Death, (Chart B-6), reprinted
in MEDICAL CARE CHARTBOOK 20 (A. Donabedian, S. Axelrod & L. Wyszewianski eds.
7th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL CARE CHARTBOOK]. Pneumonia and
influenza still accounted for slightly less than five percent of all deaths in the United
States in 1976. Tuberculosis and gastritis effectively have been eliminated as causes of
death in the United States. Id.
29. Percent Distribution of Population by Degree of Chronic Activity Limita-
tion, 1974, (Chart B-14), reprinted in id. at 28. 85.9% of the United States popula-
tion had no disability in 1974. Only 3.3% were unable to carry on major activity. Id.
30. 80"s Health Care Developments Will Stress Efficiency, Prevention, Mainte-
nance, HOSPITAL Topics, July-Aug. 1980, at 4 [hereinafter cited as 80's Health Care
Developments]. Twenty-six countries have lower death rates from circulatory dis-
ease. Id. In addition, the 1976 United States infant mortality rate was higher than
that of 14 other countries. The U.S. rate was 15.1 deaths per 1000 live births. Sweden
had the lowest rate of 8.3 deaths per 1000 live births. Infant Mortality Rates (Chart
B-7), reprinted in MEDICAL CARE CHARTBOOK, supra note 28, at 21.
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positive health practices as measured by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. 31
These achievements have coincided with the development of the
health care industry as a major factor in the American economy.
Between 1960 and 1980, investment in health research and develop-
ment increased at an average annual rate of 11.6% .32 The number of
Americans employed in the health services industry and as physicians
has steadily increased. 33 The number of hospitals in the United States
has stabilized at a high level. 34 In 1980, health expenditures consti-
tuted 9.4% of the Gross National Product 35 and totaled $1,067 for
each American. 3 These funds purchased health services and supplies
as diverse as hospital care, dental service, drugs, and eyeglasses. 37 In
almost every specific health category, expenditures by *Americans in-
31. HEALTH: UNITED STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 2.
32. National funding for health research and development and average annual
change, according to source of funds: United States, selected years 1960-1980 (Table
78), reprinted in HEALTH: UNITED STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 215. In dollar
terms, expenditures have increased from $884 million in 1960 to $7.89 billion in
1980. Id.
33. In 1980 over seven million Americans were employed in the health service
industry. Persons employed in the health service industry, according to place of
employment: United States, 1970-1980 (Table 47), reprinted in HEALTH: UNITED
STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 176. These figures included employees in offices of
physicians, dentists, chiropractors, other health practitioners, hospitals, and conva-
lescent institutions. Hospitals accounted for nearly 4 million of the nearly 7.2 million
employees of the health service industry. Id.
In 1980 almost 500,000 physicians were professionally active. Professionally active
physicians . . . selected 1950-1980 estimates and 1985, 1990 and 2000 projections
(Table 48), reprinted in HEALTH: UNITED STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 177. The
number of professionally active physicians has more than doubled from 219,000 in
1950. By the year 2000 an estimated 704,000 physicians will be active in the United
States. The number of active physicians per 10,000 population increased from 14.2 in
1950 to 20.2 in 1980. By 2000 the rate is estimated to be 27.1. Id.
34. In 1979, there were over 7,000 hospitals in the United States with over
1,250,000 beds. These figures are drawn from two tables: Short-stay hospitals and
beds, according to type of hospital and ownership: United States, 1974 and 1979
(Table 53), reprinted in HEALTH: UNITED STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 183 [herein-
after cited as Table 53], and Long-stay hospitals and beds, according to type of
hospital and ownership: United States, 1974 and 1979, (Table 58), reprinted in
HEALTH: UNITED STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 192 [hereinafter cited as Table 58].
Short-stay hospitals accounted for 6,525 of the total (Table 53, supra) while there
were 560 long-stay hospitals in 1979 (Table 58, supra).
35. HEALTH INSURANCE ASS'N OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE
DATA, 1981-1982, at 43 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK 1981-1982]. The
health care share of the Gross National Product has grown steadily from 5.4% in
1960 to 7.5% in 1970 to 9.4% in 1980. Id.
36. Id. at 42.
37. National health expenditures average annual percent change, according to
type of expenditure: United States, selected years 1950-1980 (Table 69), reprinted in
HEALTH: UNITED STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 204.
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creased at an average annual rate of at least ten percent for the period
of 1975 to 1980.38
A. Alternative Delivery Systems
As medical care expenditures have increased, media coverage and
political proposals began to focus on the issue of cost containment. 39
As a result, Americans are increasingly aware of health care costs and
interest in the concept of preventive medicine has expanded. 40 Health
facilities have responded with changes in medical and administrative
policy.
Some health care facilities have accumulated significant savings by
instituting cost reductions in service areas such as mailing charges,
sales tax payments and laundry services. 4' Medical benefit plans and
procedures for authorizing payments for certain tests also have been
modified. 42 In some cases, entirely new medical plans stressing direct
financial incentives to individual doctors have achieved encouraging
results. One such plan involves a special account for each patient
which is managed by the family doctor. 43 An insurance company
38. Id. The average annual cost increase from 1975-80 in the one exception,
"eyeglasses and appliances," was 9.8%. Id.
39. See notes 76-85 infra and accompanying text.
40. See Weinraub, Schweiker Says Social Security Is His 'Top Priority,' N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 1981, at A16, col. 1 (Health and Human Services Secretary Richard
Schweiker has cited preventive health care programs as an essential component of
any plan to reduce health costs; New Health Plans Focus On 'Wellness,' N.Y. Times,
Aug. 24, 1981, at DI, col. 1 (a growing number of businesses have turned to
prevention programs in an effort to reduce costs). But see Hoagland, The Conquest of
Disease, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1981, at A23, col. 2 (emphasis on preventive medicine
questioned).
41. Bronson, To Cut Costs, Many Hospitals Ask Their Workers For Economizing
Ideas, and the Savings Add Up, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1979, at 48, col. 1.
42. Curb on Payments For Certain Tests By Hospitals Urged, Wall St. J., Feb. 7,
1979, at 26, col. 4 (Blue Cross and Blue Shield recommended that member plans not
pay for routine diagnostic tests for non-surgical hospital admissions unless a physician
specifically ordered each test); Small Medical Bills Are Seen As Culprits In Health
Care Costs, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1979, at 21, col. 3 (emphasizing restraint in the use
of technology). See Waldholtz, Medical Benefit Costs Are Rising Sharply; Firms
Tighten Controls, Redesign Plans, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1980, at 56, col. 1 (large
corporations are using their leverage to force physicians, hospitals and insurers to
hold costs down).
43. Bishop, Sharp Reduction in Hospital Expenses Is Achieved By Novel Medical
Care Plan, Wall St. J., June 14, 1979, at 10, col. 2. The plan, called United
Healthcare, was organized by Safeco Insurance Co. in 1975. By 1979 the Plan had
23,000 subscribers. Id.
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sends the doctor a monthly check for the account. The doctor shares in
any surplus left in the account at the end of the year. 44
Alternative delivery systems stressing lower cost health care have
become more common. The development of Health Maintenance Or-
ganizations (HMOs), for example, is evidence of this trend. HMOs are
alternative delivery systems which charge a fixed, prepaid annual fee.
In exchange, the consumer receives unlimited access to a variety of
health services. 45 HMOs also provide member physicians with an
incentive to reduce costs because their income is not linked to greater
use of facilities and reimbursement from insurance companies and
government programs. Some HMOs give doctors a bonus and profit
sharing if patients are kept out of the hospital during the year.46 In the
decade from 1970 to 1980, the number of persons enrolled in Health
Maintenance Organizations increased by 300% to a total of 9.5 mil-
lion. 47
While HMOs are the most common type of alternative delivery
system, other innovations have been developed. Ambulatory surgical
centers emphasize specific aspects of surgical procedures which are too
complicated to perform in a doctor's office, but are not significant
enough to require hospitalization. 48 In addition, home health care
44. Id. If the patient's account has a deficit at the end of the year, the doctor
must return up to five percent of the payments he has received from the Insurance
Company. If the account has a surplus, United Healtheare and the doctor share that
amount equally. Id.
45. Meyers, Growth in Health Maintenance Organizations, in HEALTH: UNITED
STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 76. Meyers defines an HMO as "an organization that
provides at least ambulatory and inpatient services to a voluntarily enrolled popula-
tion on a prepaid basis." Id. In May 1971 a paper by the Dep't of Health, Education
and Welfare articulated a broader definition, citing HMOs as "organized systems of
health care, providing comprehensive services for enrolled members, for a fixed,
prepaid annual fee .... [T]hey all provide a mix of outpatient and hospital services
through a single organization and a single payment mechanism." Id. at 75, quoting
Towards a Comprehensive Health Policy for the 1970's (HEW White Paper May,
1971). The HEW paper listed three areas where HMOs differed from traditional fee
for service health care providers: (1) use of inpatient services was 40-50% lower; (2)
overall costs were 15-20% lower; (3) quality of care was better or at least equal. Id.
46. Hedberg, Health Care: Getting The Best Value, MONEY MAC., Sept. 1982, at
55, 58. The HMOs pay these bonuses directly from profits derived from healthy
subscribers who did not require extensive health care in the previous year. The
HMOs essentially "bet" that they can keep their subscribers healthy. Id.
47. Meyers, supra note 45, at 77. The first HMO was started in 1929. Id. at 76.
By 1980, HMOs were operating in 37 states. Id. In 1981 there were 240 HMOs
serving 10 million persons. Chell, Health Maintenance Groups May Find Haven in
Tax-Exempts, The Daily Bond Buyer, Aug. 31, 1981, at 11, col. 1. See notes 119-21
infra and accompanying text (discussion of HMOs growth and their relationship to
tax exempt financing).
48. A surgical center in Arizona lowered costs for eight routine operations by 43
to 61% including room and board. Surgeon's fees were 19 to 39% lower than
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providers, 49 hospices for terminally ill persons50 and birthing rooms5 '
are attempting to enter the health care market.
Cost sensitivity, however, is not a blind pursuit. If medical service is
oriented exclusively toward reducing expense, the chances for techno-
logical advances decrease. Blind cost cutting would foreclose those
technological developments necessary to provide better health care. 52
B. Insurance
Insurance has been a pivotal force in molding a health care system
which lacks competitive characteristics. 53 The current insurance struc-
hospital charges. In Florida, a cataract operation cost $300 at a surgical center
instead of $1,000 at a hospital because of lower staff labor and routine laboratory
charges. Other operations which can be performed in surgical centers on a one day
basis include tonsillectomies, simple hernia repairs, vasectomies and removal of non-
cancerous cysts. HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE, How To MAKE HEALTH CARE BENEFIT
PLANS MORE COST EFFECTIVE 2 (1980). Costs for some operations can be reduced as
much as 50% by avoiding overnight patient care. HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE,
TECHNIQUES FOR REDUCING HOSPITAL COSTS 2 (1980).
49. Home health care programs are useful for chronically ill or disabled persons
and patients who require maintenance care or mere monitoring during rehabilita-
tion. Home health care includes skilled nursing, physical therapy, occupational
therapy, medication and laboratory services. HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE, TECH-
NIQUES FOR REDUCING HOSPITAL COSTS 4 (1980).
50. HEALTH INSURANCE Ass'N OF AMERICA, COST CONTAINMENT FEATURES IN NEW
GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE POLICIES (1981). Thirty percent of U.S. insurance policies
currently cover hospice care. These policies cover almost one-half of the employees in
a recent survey. Id.
51. Birthing rooms are homelike maternity facilities. Since 1975, the number of
facilities has grown rapidly and now over 1,000 of the country's 6,500 hospitals have
these units. Many observers expect the number of facilities to double or triple in a few
years. Direct savings to patients are said to be $80 million per year. Lublin, The
Birthing Room, More Hospitals Offer Maternity Facilities That Feel Like Home,
Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
52. Some of the new medical advances include gene splicing technologies, diag-
nostic imaging equipment which combines sophisticated graphics and computer
technology, new drugs and drug delivery systems, laser beams and implantable
computers. Putnam Health Sciences Trust Pamphlet 8. (This pamphlet promotes
investment in a Trust which will then purchase health related stocks and other
instruments). At the same time, these advances are expensive. CAT scanners can cost
in excess of one million dollars and new models are constantly outdating previous
machines. Hedberg, supra note 46, at 56. Recent debate over the cost of artificial
hearts for humans illustrates the competing concerns. Some doctors state that ques-
tions of cost are unthinkable because the primary issue is keeping the patient alive.
Others view the issue as a question of resource allocation. Jay Cohn, M.D., has said
that the time has passed when "we thought we could do everything." Carrell, Costs
mark debate on artificial heart, American Medical News, Jan. 28, 1983 at 1, col. 1.
The outcome of such debates will determine whether new technologies are devel-
oped.
53. MacKay, The Regulation of Health Insurance, in REGULATING HEALTH CARE,
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 81, 86 (A. Levin ed. 1980). The insurance function has
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ture has paid an increasing percentage of personal health care expend-
itures in the United States. 54 Direct private payments have decreased
and a further reduction is expected.5 5 Although these third party
payments insulate consumers from direct payments of their medical
bills, they serve as a disincentive for health care providers to keep costs
down. 56
Insurance is a convenient sharing of risk which substitutes for vol-
untary personal savings.5 7 While the general activity of insuring is an
established business, widespread health insurance is a recent phenom-
enon. 58 Providers of health services encouraged the use of insurance
plans because the insurance system was a more reliable payment
mechanism than individual collections. 59 The beneficial tax treatment
of health benefits has also encouraged the use of insurance. Health
benefits are exempt from the calculation of a person's income for tax
purposes and the employer's premium payments are tax deductible. 0
Finally, increasingly complex and expensive care has placed even
been separated from marketplace influences. This encourages providers and con-
sumers to utilize treatments without sensitivity to the true cost of the health care.
With a growing share of medical costs paid by insurance, the influence of this cost-
insensitive approach is significant. Id.
54. 80's Health Care Developments, supra note 30, at 6. Insurance paid 45 % of
personal health care expenditures in 1960, 60% in 1970 and 67% in 1980. These
figures represent the combined total of government and private third party payments
for personal health care expenditures. The balance for each year is accounted for by
direct private payments. Id.
55. Id. By 1990 it is estimated that insurance will pay 75% of personal health
care expenditures. Id.
56. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 857. Without insurance, a person might
decide not to consume medical services. However, when the individual receives no
benefit for decreasing consumption, he is encouraged to consume the maximum
service available. Id. See MacKay, supra note 53, at 86 (doctor has little incentive to
reduce costs because he knows a third party will pay the patient's bill).
57. Fuchs, Paying for Medical Care, in MANAGING THE FINANCES OF HEALTH
CARE ORGANIZATIONS 11 (G. Bishbee & R. Vraciu ed. 1980). Alternative methods for
sharing risk include extended family and kinship obligations. Id.
58. MacKay, supra note 53, at 82. Twelve million Americans had hospital insur-
ance in 1940 while 77 million had such coverage in 1950. Id. See SOURCE BOOK 1981-
1982, supra note 35, at 6-7. By 1980, 186 million Americans had some form of health
insurance. This figure represents 85 % of the civilian noninstitutional population. Id.
Estimates of the number of persons without private or public health insurance vary
from 5% to 12.6%. Id. at 11. See generally Hertzberg, Health Care Coverage For
Small Firms Springs A Bad Leak, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1982, at 1, col. 6. Not all
insurance arrangements are reliable. A number of multiple employer trusts (MET)
have experienced financial difficulty. METs are often used by small businesses to
offer employees benefits similar to the group health plans of large corporations. Id.
59. Fuchs, supra note 57, at 12.
60. Duncan, supra note 7, at 23. See note 14 supra (discussion of I.R.C. sections
which provide tax benefits to employees and employers).
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routine medical treatment beyond affordable levels for many individ-
uals, making insurance a necessity."'
Expenditures under both private health insurance benefit plans and
government programs have increased in the last three decades.6 2 In
the 1970's, however, the costs of such benefits and programs expanded
dramatically. From 1975 to 1980 benefits paid by insurance compan-
ies and hospital-medical plans such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield in-
creased over 100% .63 During the same period, federal, state and local
government expenditures for health care increased eighty-six per-
cent. 4 Federal expenditures constituted the majority of government
outlays for health.6 5
In addition to the dramatic increase in medical costs, there has been
a change in the source of payment for personal health care expendi-
tures in the United States. 6 The government share of payments has
increased substantially in the last twenty years. 7 Private third party
insurance payments have been relatively consistent.68 Direct private
payments, however, have fallen from fifty-five percent in 1960 to
thirty-three percent in 1980.9 By 1990 even fewer personal health
care expenditures will be paid by direct private payments. Private
third party insurance payments will remain constant and the govern-
ment share will continue to increase. 70
Experimentation with cost containment in the insurance field has
yielded some results, yet costs continue to increase at levels which
61. Fuchs, supra note 57, at 12.
62. Personal health care expenditures and percent distribution, according to
source of payment: United States, selected years 1929-1980 (Table 67), reprinted in
HEALTH: UNITED STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 202 [hereinafter cited as Table 67].
The percentage of payments made directly by individuals dropped during this same
period from 65.5% to 32.4%. Id. At the same time, the total bill for all personal
health care expenditures (not limited to insurance payments) was growing dramati-
cally from $10.9 billion in 1950 to $217.9 billion in 1980. Id.
63. SOURCE BOOK 1981-1982, supra note 35, at 6 (payments were $33 billion in
1975 and $70 billion in 1980).
64. Id. at 35 (government expenditures for health care were $56 billion in 1975
and $104 billion in 1980).
65. Id. (federal expenditures accounted for $70 billion of the total $104 billion).
66. Table 67, supra note 62. See 80"s Health Care Developments, supra note 30,
at 6 (chart on distribution of payments for personal health care costs).
67. Id. The government paid for 22% of personal health care expenditures in
1960 and 39% in 1980. Id.
68. Id. These payments have increased from 23% in 1960 to 28% in 1980. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. By 1990 it is estimated that direct private payments will account for 25%
of personal health care expenditures with private insurance payments at 30 % and the
government share at 45%. Id.
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cannot be absorbed indefinitely. 71 While past growth in the govern-
ment share of health expenditures has been at the expense of private
payments," the survival of the private health insurance industry may
rest on the public's perception of its ability to provide services more
efficiently than the government.7 3
The insurance system has been unable to contain rising health
costs.74 This ultimately affects individuals because in the final analysis
there is no third party payor. Increased health costs result in higher
premiums, whether through direct payment to insurance companies
or higher taxes to finance government programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid .7
III. Politics and Regulation
Health care is a major political issue in America.76 President Carter
promised a universal health insurance plan during his 1976 cam-
paign. 77 President Reagan focused on cost containment pledges during
71. See notes 40-48 supra and accompanying text (discusses experimentation with
cost containment). See also Pear, supra note 2 (rising health costs could become
insupportable and therefore threaten the quality and accessibility of the American
health care system).
72. See notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text (discussion of percentages of
health care expenditures paid by various sources).
73. MacKay, supra note 53, at 91. If the current insurance system cannot deal
efficiently with areas such as fair and prompt payment, cost control and quality
maintenance, the alternative is likely to be a form of socialized medicine. Id. Social-
ized medicine is generally described as government control of the medical facilities
and government employment of medical personnel as civil servants. Id. at 86.
74. Id. at 90. MacKay cites an inadequate emphasis on the economic conse-
quences of the third party payment system as a major contributor to this problem. Id.
75. Hedberg, supra note 47, at 56. See Stetson, State Workers to Pay 10 % Share
of Insurance In Cost Saving Move, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1982, at Al, col. 4 (New
York State has turned to increased premiums).
76. In 1982, the Reagan Administration considered a means test for Medicare.
Pear, U.S. Is Studying Limit On Income Under Medicare, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,
1982, at Al, col. 1. Senior officials had deliberately not investigated such Social
Security issues before the Nov. 2 election. Id. The idea caused an outbreak of heated
criticism and Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, quickly
assured that he would personally be opposed to the idea. Pear, Schweiker Assails
Curb On Medicare, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1982, at A22, col. 1. Despite the negative
political effects of even raising the issue, there are indications that it may be a
reasonable idea. Linda Miller, Executive Director of Volunteer Trustees of Non-
Profit Hospitals, has said that (1) the concept of tying Social Security benefits to
income is necessary for the System's survival and (2) opponents of the idea are more
concerned with setting a precedent than with the merits of the specific proposal.
Linda Miller, Letter to the Editor, Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1982, at 7, col. 1.
77. Carter Health Plan Asks Firms to Insure Employees for Costs Above $2,500 a
Year, Wall St. J., June 13, 1979, at 3, col. 2. The Carter plan was introduced with a
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the 1980 election. 78 Senator Kennedy has long viewed health care as
one of his primary concerns .
7
Despite the importance uniformly accorded health care problems,
congressional action reflects the lack of a national consensus on solu-
tions."0 The Senate has insisted on budget cutbacks81 while the House
has defeated bills aimed at cost containment.8 2 Commentators have
"Phase One" program which included a new federal insurance program called
HealthCare which would consolidate Medicare and Medicaid. HealthCare would be
government run but the private sector would compete in providing some aspects of
the program. In addition, employers would be required to offer full time employees
an insurance package covering health expenses above $2,500 per year. The final
aspect of the program was to increase the emphasis on competition and preventive
care. Id.
78. See Duncan, supra note 7, at 22. The Reagan plan is currently being formu-
lated. Id. at 24.
79. Shabecoff, Kennedy Offers Broad Health Plan And Challenges Carter to
Support It, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1979, at Al, col. 4. The Kennedy proposal would
guarantee complete health care to every American. In addition, tight federal regula-
tion of the insurance industry and tough cost controls were included. Kennedy Offers
Revised National Health Plan; Broad Role Set For Private Insurers, Wall St. J., May
15, 1979, at 3, col. 2. See also T. KENNEDY, IN CRITICAL CONDITION: THE CRISIS IN
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE (1972). The proposal outlined in this book,' the Health
Security Program, envisioned the federal government replacing the insurance indus-
try totally and becoming the sole health insurance carrier for the entire nation. Id. at
238. The federal government would also set up controls and incentives to health
providers to insure uniform quality care at a reasonable cost to all Americans. Id. at
239. Finally, the government would assume responsibility for training health care
professionals and for building health facilities. Id.
80. See notes 77-79 supra & 81-82 infra and accompanying text (examples of
different political proposals and lack of legislative consensus).
State level disagreements have also arisen. For example, in New York State, the
Governor's office and New York City teaching hospitals were sharply divided on the
need for new construction of health care facilities costing almost two billion dollars.
Statewide planned construction was estimated at five billion dollars. Sullivan, New
York State Panel Due To Ask A Freeze On Hospital Construction, N.Y. Times, Dec.
14, 1982, at Al, col. 3. Consequently, a one-year freeze was proposed on all new
hospital construction in New York in an effort to evaluate all proposals thoroughly.
Sullivan, Cuomo to Freeze Hospital Building, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1983, at Al, col.
5; Sullivan, Hospital Council Studies Freeze Urged by Cuomo, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,
1983, at B3, col. 1.
81. Hunt, Senate Rejects Effort Made By Kennedy To Stop Budget Recissions in
Health Area, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1979, at 14, col. 3. Kennedy's effort was largely
symbolic, but the conflict emphasized the political difficulty of reaching consensus on
health care policies which involved a choice between medical lobbying groups and
budget cutting. Id.
82. House Defeats Cost Controls for Hospitals, Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1979, at 5,
col. 1. The House rejected mandatory elements of Carter's cost control program for
hospitals. The Administration cited hospital industry lobby pressure as the cause of
the defeat. Id. Such legislative difficulties have led to searches for alternative means
of influencing health care. Lublin, Administration Studies Ways to Control Some
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stated that cost containment measures have no chance of popular
support if they involve service cutbacks, 83 yet others have found that
Americans are willing to accept significant changes in the current
system in exchange for reduced costs.84 While these debates take
place, a continued increase in government outlays for health care is
projected .85
Government programs have resulted in health care regulations at
all levels. 86 The federal government is active through Medicare and
Medicaid and other specialized programs. 87 State and local programs
have proliferated through State Health Agencies. 88
The federal government has been involved in regulating both sup-
ply and demand in the health care field. 89 Regulation of health care
currently centers on Certificate of Need (CON) and Professional
Standards Review Organization (PSRO) programs. CON strives to
prevent new construction of unneeded facilities.90 CON programs
oversee major capital expenditures and regulate changes in the nature
Hospital Costs Without Legislation, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1980, at 6, col. 2 (expand-
ing current regulations to encompass more hospital services).
83. Levin, supra note 10, at 4 (noting difficulty of altering established consump-
tion patterns). See Feldstein, The Political Environment of Regulation, in REGULAT-
ING HEALTH CARE, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 8 (A. Levin ed. 1980) (a priority of
health associations is legislation which increases the demand for their member's
services).
84. Reinhold, Majority in Survey on Health Care Are Open To Changes to Cut
Costs, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1982, at Al, col. 3. The New York Times poll showed
willingness to increase the use of doctor's assistants, substitute clinics for private
physicians and pay higher deductibles. About one-third of those surveyed would be
willing to wait longer for an appointment, limit the use of expensive technology or
give up their right to sue for malpractice in exchange for lower health costs. Id. at
DII, col. 1.
85. Freeland & Schendler, supra note 2, at 112. This report lists projections of
$462 billion for national health expenditures in 1985 and $821 billion in 1990. Id. at
97.
86. See SOURCE BOOK 1981-1982, supra note 35, at 86-90 (historical overview of
health legislation and programs).
87. Id. at 33-34. Specialized programs include provisions for military personnel
and dependants, federal civilian employees, veterans, American Indians, Alaskan
natives, and federal assistance for state payments under workers compensation laws
in the various states. Id.
88. Id. at 34. There were 3,100 local health departments operating in 1980.
Fifty-seven State Health Agencies were operative in the same period. Id.
89. See D. WARREN, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 289-97 (1978) (overview of the
Hill-Burton Program, Medicare, and Medicaid).
90. The Certificate of Need program is a complex topic discussed at length in
CHAYET & SONNENREICH, P.C., CERTIFICATE OF NEED: AN EXPANDING REGULATORY
CONCEPT (1978 & Supp. 1978) (compilation and analysis of federal and state laws
and procedures). See generally Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 870-73 (overview
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of the services offered by particular facilities. 9' By controlling the
oversupply of health care facilities, CON programs strive to reduce
excessive demand for health services and therefore third party pay-
ments through insurance and government programs. 92
While CONs are principally concerned with capital cost contain-
ment, 93 PSROs review the quality and cost of actual medical serv-
ices.9 4 PSROs were designed to oversee the effectiveness of health care
received by Medicare, Medicaid and Maternal and Child Health Pro-
gram patients. 95 PSROs have been criticized as being tokens of the
organized professional interests which dominate their membership.9 6
Their positive effect on health care cost containment is unclear due to
difficulties in measuring their contributions.97
The regulatory approach has dominated health care since World
War 11.98 While regulation cannot be instantly or totally eliminated,
there is widespread dissatisfaction with the current level of govern-
ment intervention in the health care system. 99 The success of large
government programs has been questioned while their contribution to
inflationary pressures has been criticized. There is a growing recogni-
of CON in a Market Approach context). CON laws were upheld as constitutional by
the Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978), aff'g 445 F.
Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
91. CHAYET & SONNENREICH, P. C., supra note 90, at v. See C. HAVIGHURST,
DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 53-76 (1982) (CON restrains unneeded
investment in health care facilities).
92. C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 91, at 53-76. See CHAYEr & SONNENREICH, P. C.,
supra note 90, at vi-vii (analysts have noted that hard data on the effectiveness of the
CON program is not readily available).
93. C. HAvIGHURsT, supra note 91, at 36.
94. Berman & Gertman, Cost Containment and Quality Assurance: The Poten-
tial and Performance of the Professional Standards Review Organization Program, in
FEDERAL HEALTH PROGRAMS 43 (S. Altman & H. Sapolsky eds. 1981).
95. Id. at 46. When a PSRO determines that inappropriate care was given, it can
impose sanctions including payment denials, exclusion from the Medicare and Medi-
caid programs, and fines up to $5,000. These penalties are seldom used, however,
because the PSRO's emphasize peer pressure and voluntary compliance. Id. at 47.
96. C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 91, at 90. Another criticism of PSROs is that they
are attempting to accomplish an impossible task by judging the medical merits of
specific treatments for individual patients. Id. at 37.
97. Berman & Gertman, supra note 94, at 57-58; C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 91,
at 26, citing Cong. Budget Office, The Effect of PSROs on Health Care Costs:
Current Findings and Future Evaluations (Background Paper June 1979) (difficulty
in determining measure of PSRO effectiveness).
98. See note 6 supra and accompanying text (examples of regulatory measures
since World War II).
99. This dissatisfaction is expressed in the proposals to change the role of govern-
ment involvement. See C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 91, at 14-15 (advocating short-
term, competition-sensitive regulation); Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 925 (to
foster competition means to redefine regulation, not eliminate it).
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tion that new methods for directing the health care system are
needed. 100
IV. The Health Care Finance Market
Access to capital has been identified as a critical issue for health
care providers in the 1980's.101 In the 1970's the principal factors
affecting health care financing were complex regulatory issues. 102 In
the 1980's the financial requirements of a competitive health care
market will shape health care finance.10 3
Health care financing has centered on hospitals, which until 1960
met their capital needs chiefly through gifts and internal sources.10 4
This pattern gradually changed, however, as capital requirements
outgrew traditional sources. 10 5 Since 1971, tax exempt hospital bonds
have become an increasingly important source of capital. 10 6 Addi-
tional financing methods have emerged in both the taxable and tax
100. Pollard, supra note 13, at 159 ("what really matters is the recognition that
new methods for managing old problems are in order").
101. BLYTH EASTMAN PAINE WEBBER HEALTH CARE FUNDING, INC., HEALTH CARE
POLICY: THE CRISIS IN CAPITAL FORMATION (1982) (Intro.) [hereinafter cited as THE
CRISIS IN CAPITAL FORMATION]. This report was prepared to present an overview of
the issues affecting health care financing in the 1980's.
102. Id. Regulation often sent conflicting instructions to the health care industry.
For example, cost-based reimbursement encouraged growth in medical programs
and facilities yet failed to recognize the. true cost of capital. This resulted in what
investment bankers argue is an undercapitalized health care industry. Id.
103. Id. The emphasis on competition will generate new requirements for capital
to renovate outmoded facilities, convert beds and facilities to serve new markets,
develop new technologies, and respond to competitive innovations from other pro-
viders. Id. at 2.
104. R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, MUNICIPAL BONDS 185 (1980). Internal sources of
capital were operations and depreciation. Some small federal grants, bank mortgages
and taxable mortgage bonds from insurance companies or a bank were also utilized.
Id.
105. Hospital construction costs, new technology, population shifts and increased
utilization of health facilities stimulated the needs for new financing mechanisms. Id.
The decline of federal grants and lower rates of philanthrophic donations also
contributed to the trend. Hernandez, Griggs, Henkel & Howie (Health Finance
Group, Kidder, Peabody & Co.), Review of Health Care Finance, 1978, in MANAG-
ING THE FINANCES OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 471, 474 (1980).
106. HEALTH CARE FINANCING STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 3. Tax exempt
bonds issued in 1971 totaled $262 million. By 1974, $1.28 billion of such bonds were
issued. In 1977 the amount surged to $4.7 billion. In 1981 the amount reached $5.04
billion. Id. See Yacik, Hospital Volume Soars to Record $5 billion, The Bond Buyer,
Jan. 20, 1982, at 1, col. 2. Hospital and health care facility financings accounted for
11% of 1981 long-term tax exempt financing. Interest rates ranged from 17.13% to
8.1%. Forty-six states participated in the tax exempt market for health care in 1981.
Id. See also Fury, Interhospital Competition Fuels Year's Record Volume, The Bond
Buyer, Aug. 30, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (1982 projections are for another record year).
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exempt contexts. 0 7 Recently, there has been increased concentration
MERRILL LYNCH WHITE WELD CAPITAL MARKETS GROUP
HEALTH CARE FINANCE DEPARTMENT
Financing Alternatives Comparison Chart
Program
Character-
istics
1. Approximate
Time Required
2. Percentage
Financing
Available
3. Eligible Project
Costs
Tax-
Exempt
Bonds
3-6 Months
FHA
Insured
Mortgage
Loan/
GNMA
Guarantee
FHA
Insured
Mortgage
Loan/Tax
Exempt
Bonds
Private
Placement
Of
Conven-
tional
Mortgage
6-12 Months 7-13 Months 2-6 Months
Up to 100% of Approximately Approximately
Project Cost 90% of Project 90% of Project
Cost Cost
All Costs All Costs Including
Land, Buildings,
Equipment and
Working Capital
Up to 100% of
Project Cost
All Costs Including Determined by
Land, Buildings, Lender
Equipment and
Working Capital
4. Debt Allowed: By Policy Allowed: By Allowed: By
Refinancing Up to 25% of Statute Up to 80% Statute Up to 80%
Issue Size of Issue Size of Issue Size
Typically 30 Years
6. Maximum Fixed by
Interest Rate Law-Currently
12%
7. Financing Fees
Up to 25 Years
After Completion
of Construction
Prevailing FHA
Coupon Rate:
Currently 13.0%
Underwriting Financing and
Spread 3.0% Placement Fees of
3.5-4.5%
FHA Fee of .8%
8. Annual Fees Authority Fee and
Trustee Fee
9. Other Front-End
Fees
" Feasibility Study
$40,000-$75,000
" Legal & Printing
Expenses
$100,000-
$150,000
.5% Annual
Mortgage
Insurance
Premium on
Outstanding
Balances ("MIP")
" Feasibility Study
$40,000-$75,000
" Legal Fees
$25,000-$35,000
" Points If
Necessary to
Adjust Yield to
Current Market
Conditions
40 Years with
Anticipated 25
Year Retirement
After Completion
of Construction
Approximately
Equal to FHA
Debenture Rate
" Financing and
Placement Fees
of 3.5-4.5 %
Includes
Underwriters
Spread of
Approximately
2.5%
" FHA Fee 8%
Authority Fee,
Trustee Fee, .5%
MIP on
Outstanding
Balances
" Feasisility Study
$40,000-$75,000
" Legal & Printing
Expenses
$100,000-
$150,000
Negotiable
5-10 Years
None
Financing Fee
Negotiable
Generally
Commitment Fee
of 1.0-2.0%
Servicing Fee
Negotiable
* Legal Fees
$5,000-$25,000
5. Loan Term
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on short term financing methods in response to high interest rates.10 8
Short term financings are advantageous in reducing borrowing costs
by funding the various aspects of a project for different terms. 10 9 In
addition, long term debt issues can be postponed during temporary
periods of particularly high interest rates."l 0 Since 1980, financing
techniques have been developed or adapted specifically to address the
requirements of volatile markets."'
From 1974 to 1978 tax exempt public offerings solidified their role
as the principal debt financing source for hospitals. 12 By any measure
MERRILL LYNCH WHITE WELD CAPITAL MARKETS GROUP
HEALTH CARE FINANCE DEPARTMENT
Financing Alternatives Comparison Chart
FHA FHA Private
Insured Insured Placement
Mortgage Mortgage Of
Program Tax- Loan/ Loan/Tax Conven-
Character- Exempt GNMA Exempt tional
istics Bonds Guarantee Bonds Mortgage
10. Prepayment Pro- Restrictive, Usu- 15% of the Origi- 15% of the Origi- Negotiable
visions ally None for 8-10 nal Principal nal Principal
Years. A Declining Amount in Any Amount in Any
Penalty Thereafter Year With No Pen- Year With No Pen-
alty. A Declining alty. A Declining
Premium Thereaf- Premium Thereaf-
ter ter
For an examination of innovations in the types of financing techniques available to
hospitals, see Plimpton, Financing Boom for Health Care Borrowers, The Bond
Buyer, Aug. 30, 1982, at 10, col. 1 (zero coupon bonds, municipal multipliers or
"'TECAs"-Tax Exempt Capital Accumulators-are discussed in depth). See also
New Types of Financing Techniques Spawned, The Daily Bond Buyer, Aug. 31,
1981, at 10, col. 1 (FHA insured financings, bank letters of credit and intermediate
term equipment financing); Health Care Institutions: Why Merrill Lynch Should Be
Your Investment Banker, at 11-12 (examples of innovative financing techniques for
financing two legally separate institutions and a nine hospital system with facilities
located in three states. A federally insured mortgage was combined with tax exempt
bonds).
108. MERRILL LYNCH WHITE WELD CAPITAL MARKETS GROUP HEALTH CARE Fi-
NANCE DEP'T, SHORT TERM FINANCING OPTIONS 1 (1982). Financing techniques which
which are effective in the short-term market include demand notes, tender notes, day
notes, tax exempt commercial paper and bond anticipation notes. Id.
109. Id. Construction funds and working capital are particularly suited to short-
term financing. Id. at 2.
110. Short term financing also has negative features such as exposure to increased
rates and reduced ability to project costs over extended periods.
111. MERRILL LYNCH WHITE WELD CAPITAL MARKETS GROUP HEALTH CARE Fi-
NANCE DEP'T, FINANCING TECHNIQUES FOR VOLATILE MARKETS 1 (1982). Principal
methods include original issue discount bonds, zero coupon bonds, capital apprecia-
tion bonds, compound interest bonds, stepped coupon bonds, and tender bonds. Id.
112. R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra note 104, at 195. In 1974 tax exempt public
offerings constituted 58.3% of hospital debt financing. Private placements, 11.2%,
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they are the dominant financing method used by health care institu-
tions."1 3 Tax exempt bond financings are implemented through an
issuing authority created by state or local governments." 4 Although
tax exempt bonds are issued by an authority, they are backed by the
financial strength of the hospital for which they are intended."15
Therefore, the hospital's ability to repay the obligation provides the
basis for the rating given by the rating agencies."16 Without an ade-
quate investment grade rating, the bond issue will be rejected by the
market of potential purchasers."i
7
During the decade of the 1970's, hospitals increased their reliance
on tax exempt revenue bonds as a source of capital."l 8 Recently,
taxable public offerings, 11.3%, government sponsored programs, 12.4%, and mort-
gages with commercial banks, 6.8%, constituted the remainder of the market. By
1978 tax exempt financing's share had increased to 73.9 %. Private placements fell to
8 %, taxable public offerings to 6.5 %, government sponsored programs to 6.9 %, and
mortgages with commercial banks to 4.7 %. Id.
Tax exempt bonds also achieved prominence when measured as a source of funding
specifically for hospital construction. In 1973 tax exempt bonds accounted for 20.9 %
of hospital construction financing. By 1978 the level had risen to 49.3 %. Internal
funds represented 18.5% of construction financing while philanthropy, 6.2%, tax-
able bonds, 2.8% and direct loans, 8%, all suffered declines in their share of
construction funding. Government grants and appropriations fell from 23.5% in
1973 to 8.6% in 1978. HEALTH CARE FINANCING STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 6.
113. Id.
114. R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra note 104, at 189 (tax exempt bonds are also
issued by states, municipal hospitals, counties, or cities). In some states, there is one
issuing authority for the entire state. In others, there are local hospital authorities.
Id. See, e.g., DORMITORY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK REVENUE BONDS,
THE SOcIErY OF THE NEW YORK HOSPITAL ISSUE, SERIES A, OFFICIAL STATEMENT (Dec.
15, 1981) (example of issuing authority).
115. R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra note 104, at 189-90. The security for a
hospital bond issue is a revenue pledge. Id. at 190.
116. Id. at 189. In addition to any legal obligations incurred by a state regarding
payment of hospital authority debts, a moral obligation may exist. Moral obligation
bonds are supported only by a state's moral obligation to supplement a project's
revenues if the revenues are insufficient to fulfill financing commitments. See Green-
berg, Municipal Securities: Some Basic Principles and Practices, 9 URB. LAW. 338,
346 (1977) (discussion of moral obligation bonds).
117. R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra note 104, at 189. A hospital bond issue
should have at least a BBB rating to be attractive to investors. Credit rating agencies
determine to a large extent whether a hospital will have access to the capital markets.
They screen out those institutions with low creditworthiness and an unfavorable or
speculative rating (less than BBB) may foreclose access to credit markets. In addition,
the rating will help to determine the interest rate which the market will demand.
Taddey, The Importance of Ratings to Health Care Borrowers, The Daily Bond
Buyer, July 28, 1980, Tax Exempt Hosp. Fin. Supp. at 7. The two leading credit
rating agencies are Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard & Poor's Corp. Both
agencies assign letter grades to obligations ranging from Moody's Aaa to C and
Standard & Poor's AAA to D. Fabozzi, Interest Rates and the Securities Markets, in
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 30-31 (F. Fabozzi & F. Zarb eds. 1980).
118. See note 106 supra (increased use of hospital revenue bonds).
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Health Maintenance Organizations have also begun to utilize tax
exempt bond financings."19 Nearly all 240 existing HMOs have expan-
sion plans. In addition, 100 new HMOs are under development. 120
This expansion will increase HMO capital financing requirements.
HMO capital analysts are cautious, however, about the quality of
HMO investment opportunities due to their recent development and
small size. 121
Health care financings through the 1980's are expected to continue
the established trends of declining government support and reduced
levels of philanthropy. 122 In addition, reimbursement policies under
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid are not expected to emerge
as an internal source of capital funds.123 Debt financing is expected to
continue to dominate as a source of capital, with tax exempt financing
accounting for seventy to eighty percent of total health care borrow-
ing. 124
The interest rates which health care institutions must offer to at-
tract capital are expected to remain relatively high due to internal
administrative considerations and external market pressures. Inter-
nally, hospitals and other health care providers must balance capital
structure, liquidity and cash flow. In the past, hospitals have relied
upon substantial returns on their investments to maintain constant
operating margins in spite of growing problems in the reimbursement
funding area. This financial practice discourages investors. 125 Exter-
nally, hospitals are faced with the same challenges confronting all
participants in the capital markets. High interest rates and investor
119. Examples of HMOs utilizing tax exempt financing are the Rutgers Commu-
nity Health Plan in New Brunswick, N.J., Chell, supra note 45, at 11, col. 1, and the
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, Analysts Size Up lMOs, New Health
Care Alternative, Bond Buyer, Aug. 30, 1982, at 15, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as
Analysts Size Up HMOs].
120. Chell, supra note 45, at 11, col. 1.
121. Id. Lack of past financial records and the small size of most HMOs will
probably prevent an HMO from obtaining an investment grade rating for bond issues
in the near future. Private placement is an alternative method of financing. Id. See
Analysts Size Up HMOs, supra note 119, at 15, col. 4 (compared to hospitals, HMOs
are perceived as riskier investments lacking real credit stature).
122. Phillips, Capital Finance-Capital Outlook: Some Encouragement, Much
Concern, Many Changes, HOSPITALS, Apr. 16, 1982, at 70.
123. Id. When reimbursement rates do not reflect the true cost of operation,
undercapitalization of the institution results. THE CRISIS IN CAPITAL FORMATION,
supra note 101, at Intro.
124. Phillips, supra note 122, at 70.
125. Id. at 70-71. Interest on investments subsidizes operating margins. This
income is dependent on continued high interest rates. Id. at 70. If these rates decline,
the subsidy will be reduced.
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resistance in 1981 and 1982 resulted in the necessity for offering higher
yields.126 In addition, municipalities are entering the tax exempt mar-
ket more frequently as a result of reductions in federal and state
revenue sharing and larger budget deficits. 2 The higher volume of
other municipal securities on the market provides direct competition
with tax exempt health care offerings.128 Increased competition within
the health care market will challenge the credit status of existing
institutions.129 Moreover, alternative delivery systems such as HMOs,
ambulatory care centers, and surgicenters will crowd the capital mar-
ket. 130
In the context of this strenuous competition for capital, the aggre-
gate financing requirements of the health care industry are expanding
rapidly. 131 The continued survival of particular health care facilities
126. In the latter half of 1982, interest rates declined, but long term rates are not
expected to fall drastically. No More "Dr. Death"? But Al Wojnilower Is Still Far
From A Raging Bull, Barron's, Nov. 8, 1982, at 8, col. 1 (interview by editors of
Barron's).
127. Federal and state aid to municipalities is affected by budget constraints as
well as municipal needs. See, e.g., THE CITY OF NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATION
BONDS, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 21, 31-34 (Jan. 14, 1983). New York City projects a
decline in unrestricted federal and state aid from $832 million in 1983 to $795 million
in 1986. Id. at 31. Federal and state categorical grants are expected to remain at
approximately the same level from 1983-1986. Id. at 33. The city also notes that the
Reagan Administration has reduced federal support to states and localities. Id. at 34.
Future budget reductions and the effects of inflation could further increase the
amount of funding which localities must raise either through debt or taxes.
128. THE CRISIS IN CAPITAL FORMATION, supra note 101, at 4. The process of
financing the "reindustrialization" of America crowds the capital markets. The
utility industry has estimated its capital needs from 1983 to 1988 at $150 billion.
Municipalities have major public works to rebuild. The federal government has
become a massive borrower due to its large budget deficits. Id. See HEALTH CARE
FINANCING STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 45. To the extent that the capital needs of
alternative providers crowd the market and encourage higher interest rates, all
issuers suffer. This is unlikely to occur, however, because alternative providers will
not be borrowing a large enough aggregate amount to unilaterally affect rates. Total
health care volume comprised only 7.8% of the total municipal bond volume in
1980. Id.
129. THE CRISIS IN CAPITAL FORMATION, supra note 101, at 6. Investors may be
uncertain about the ultimate success of their institution in a competitive health care
market. Consequently, they are expected to raise credit criteria, making it more
difficult to obtain an investment grade rating. See Analysts Size Up HMOs, supra
note 119. The higher financing costs will lead to reliance on the federal government
or private placements with insurance companies or venture capital firms. Id.
130. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text (HMOs have already begun to
utilize the tax exempt market).
131. Fury, supra note 106, at 1, col. 1. Investment bankers have projected a need
for $150 billion in long term hospital bonds during the 1980's. Id. See THE CRISIS IN
CAPITAL FORMATION, supra note 101, at 2. One organization views $150 billion as the
requirement for only renovation and replacement. During the entire decade of the
1970's approximately $50 billion of long term hospital bonds were issued. Id.
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will depend on- their ability to compete successfully in the tax exempt
capital market. 3 2
V. The Market Approach View of the Health Care Industry
Health care has been considered immune to the market forces of
supply and demand. 33 Competition theory, also referred to as the
Market Approach, does not accept this immunity. 134 Competition
theory is not a new economic concept, yet it has only recently been
gaining credibility in the health care industry.13 5
Market Approach advocates begin with the assumption that com-
peting providers are more efficient than government regulators in
identifying and maintaining the lowest market price for health care
services. 36 The Market Approach focuses competitive efforts in two
areas: (1) quality of service and (2) price. 137 At its most basic concep-
tual level, the Market Approach advocates that health care move
132. 'Haves' to Battle 'Have Nots' For Funds, But Crisis Will Benefit Hospital
Industry, HOSPITALS, Feb. 16, 1982, at 53-54. The result, according to one expert, is
that 6,000 of today's 7,000 hospitals will survive. Id. at 55. The challenges of raising
capital have led to innovative financings. Guncheon, Capital Finance: Only the Best
Laid Plans Bring Capital Success, HOSPITALS, Apr. 16, 1982, at 72-74. See Henry,
Financing Hospital Expansion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at D19, col. I (use of
syndicated partnerships to attract capital). The consequences of failing in the compe-
tition for capital or being cut off from government funding are severe, often implying
the inability to survive. Yanish, Proposed FmHA Loan Program Cuts Frighten Small
and Rural Hospitals, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr. 1981, at 111. For small hospitals, it
is often impossible to obtain an investment grade bond rating, thus closing them out
of the tax exempt bond market, Id.
See THE CRISIS IN CAPITAL FORMATION, supra note 101, at 12. At least one invest-
ment banking firm is explicit in its warning: "The bottom line, during the 1980's, is
your institutional survival. The key to survival is access to the capital markets in a
fiercely competitive environment. The very real crisis is that your access to the
capital markets is going to get tougher." Id.
133. Pollard, supra note 13, at 158. This immunity is said to extend from the
precept that medicine is too complex for those not in the health profession to under-
stand. While experimentation in other areas may lead to financial loss or inconven-
ience, medical care errors are said to lead to irreparable harm, thus justifying an
insulation from competition. Id. at 158-59.
134. Id. Pollard is careful to distinguish between competition among providers
and totally uncontrolled exposure to market abuses. Id.
135. A. SOMERS, HOSPITAL DEREGULATION: THE DILEMMA OF PUBLIC POLICY 6-15
(1969) (discussion of prospects for competition in the health care industry in the late
1960's and early 1970's).
136. Pollard, supra note 13, at 159 (in a competitive setting, prices will be kept
low and scarce resources will be efficiently distributed).
137. Id. See C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 91, at 2. Havighurst has said that the lack
of competition in health care has provided insulation for providers from consumer
accountability on both price and quality of care. Id.
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away from government regulation toward two conditions of a com-
petitive market: free market entry and free consurher choice among
alternative providers. 13 Changes perceived as necessary to implement
these goals include alteration of the insurance system, the use of cost
sharing by patients and the restructuring of the supply of medical care
to facilitate price competition. 39
Market oriented policies have been divided into two groups. 40 The
first faction emphasizes consumer pressure on providers to control
costs by making the consumer pay a higher percentage of health care
costs directly out of pocket.' 4' The second faction advocates competi-
tion between the existing fee for service system and various types of
alternative delivery systems. 42 While some alternative delivery sys-
tems are already functioning, the entry of new lower cost alternative
providers is an essential component of the second faction's competitive
plan. 143 The Market Approach does not require society to collectively
choose one theory to the exclusion of the other. Rather, a market
138. Reinhardt, Table Manners At The Health Care Feast, Financing Health
Care: Competition Versus Regulation, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH PRIVATE
SEcToR CONFERENCE 24 (March 23-24, 1981). The chief proponent of a strict adher-
ence to these principles is Milton Friedman. Id. Commentators advocating a more
controlled use of competitive forces are Martin Feldstein and Alain Enthoven. Id. at
29-30.
139. Address by Uwe Reinhardt, Emerging Trends In The Economics Of Health
Care, Fourth Annual Meeting of the Society for Hospital Planning of the American
Hospital Ass'n (May 3, 1982) (Exhibit 13) [hereinafter cited as Reinhardt Address].
Among the proposed changes in the insurance industry are: (1) force consumers to
purchase health insurance out of after tax income, (2) require mandatory options on
choice of insurance to be offered to employees (with perhaps a voluntary or manda-
tory Medicaid/Medicare voucher system), and (3) regulate health insurance to en-
courage insurer pressure on price and utilization patterns recommended by health
care providers. Id.
140. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 894. See id. at 895-97 (discussion of the
questions raised by the two subgroups).
141. Pollard, supra note 13, at 160-61 (discussion of increased consumer pay-
ments). See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 894-95. Increased direct consumer
payments could be accomplished by deductibles or coinsurance with a ceiling on out
of pocket payments that varied with household income. This approach involves two
assumptions: (1) consumers will learn to choose less costly alternatives because they
will be paying more of the cost, and (2) an attitude of conservation of scarce resources
will be developed in the health care industry. Id.
142. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 895 (stating need for new market
participants). This strategy assumes that consumers will make wise quality and price
choices if offered "prepackaged alternatives." Id. See C. HAvIGHURsT, supra note 91,
at 111 (HMOs are only one type of alternative delivery system).
143. Reinhardt Address, supra note 139, at Exhibit 13. Reinhardt has identified
the restructuring of the supply of health care to facilitate competition as one of the
"Five Pillars of the 'Pro Competitive' Strategy." Id.
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system will dictate which combination is most appropriate. 144 Regard-
less of which method dominates, three steps must be implemented to
curb cost increases: (1) improve competition, (2) initiate cost aware-
ness and (3) reform health care financing as a long range solution. 45
Advocates of the Market Approach emphasize that increased com-
petition is not synonymous with the total elimination of government
participation in health care. 146 Yet even among Market Approach
advocates, differences arise concerning specific types of governmental
participation. 147 Two commentators have proposed a redefinition of
the government role which would orient regulation toward establish-
ing access to truthful information about market alternatives, prevent-
ing entrenched provider groups from restricting competitive efforts
and assuring that the poor and very sick are adequately considered in
the competitive environment. 4 According to this view, the govern-
ment would neither regulate nor review an individual provider's
charges or utilization patterns. It would not set area-wide expenditure
ceilings or monitor investments in facilities and services. 149 Such a
controlled government role would promote a market-oriented health
delivery system while preserving recent gains in consumer protection
and universal access to health care.150
Professor Schramm has proposed a wider government role through
his model act for a state-based approach to hospital cost containment.
He visualizes a commission created specifically to stimulate competi-
tion using different methods for each sector of the industry. 15' The
commission would have authority to plan hospital investment, license
hospitals and limit statewide capital expenditure. This single commis-
sion would control entry to and exit from the industry and coordinate
the regulation of all health institutions. 15 2
144. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 897. See C. HAVIGrURST, supra note 91,
at 14-15. Havighurst has recognized that in a free society there will be a wide variety
of economic and philosophical ideas regarding the delivery of and payment for health
care. Rather than imposing a single set of values on the entire system, a Market
Approach will allow for the accomodation of different ideas and the development of
alternative providers to serve each constituency.
145. Schramm, supra note 2, at 641 (financing reform is a component of
Schramm's model pro-competition statute).
146. See notes 148-52 inJra and accompanying text (discussion of alternative im-
plementation proposals).
147. See notes 148-52 infra and accompanying text (various government roles
discussed).
148. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 925 (description of proposed redefinition
of the government role).
149. Id. (discussion of limits of government role).
150. Id. at 924-25.
151. Schramm, supra note 2, at 649 (discussion of the model commission).
152. Id. at 647-49 (discussion of the specific powers created by the model statute).
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By introducing active competition into the health care sector, pro-
ponents of the Market Approach hope to achieve substantial improve-
ments in health delivery. Competition will increase the quality of care
offered while stimulating greater efficiency in the delivery of that
care. The Approach provides incentives for innovative cost contain-
ment practices and maximizes the value added for each dollar ex-
pended. 15
3
A. Criticism of the Market Approach
Criticism of the Market Approach focuses on consumer inability to
understand health care, fears of reduced quality and a perceived lack
of safeguards for those without buying power. 54 The proponents of
the Market Approach address each of these questions. They argue that
consumers are able to comprehend health care issues. 55 Consumer
interest and study of health care is likely to grow quickly once con-
sumers realize that their purchasing power can affect the outcome of
debates within a competitive health care sector. 56 Commentators
supporting this procompetition theory also state that the quality of
health care may improve, rather than deteriorate, once informed
consumers begin comparing providers. This is particularly true if
consumers, operating through employer or union groups, can apply
their collective bargaining power. 151 These proponents also claim that
they will not abandon their societal commitments to groups with little
purchasing power. 5 8
153. C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 91, at 14. The transition from regulation to
competition holds great promise, yet a quick reversal of all controls is not considered
reasonable. Instead, Havighurst argues for a system of "competition-sensitive regula-
tion" which could be oriented toward gradual deregulation. Id. at 14-15. See notes
154-58 infra and accompanying text (discussion of criticism of the Market Approach).
154. Pollard, supra note 13, at 158-59 (discussion of concerns about effects of
Market Approach).
155. Id. at 161. It is certain that consumer knowledge will develop gradually. The
transition from passive recipient to active participant will not be simple when
making a decision regarding an individual provider. In addition, fraud and improper
advertising would require careful enforcement of existing laws. Id.
156. Id. The basic change in the marketplace from provider monopoly to con-
sumer control is seen as adequate incentive to encourage consumers to obtain the
knowledge they need. Id.
157. Reinhardt Address, supra note 139, at Exhibit 13. Reinhardt has identified
the importance of mandatory multiple choice insurance options for employees as an
essential component of a competitive strategy. Id. In addition, he encourages the
insurance industry to apply greater pressure on providers to influence prices. Id. See
Pollard, supra note 13, at 161. At this time, however, collective bargaining by
employers or unions can actually be a hindrance to consumer choice in health care
because the employer or union selects a single plan for all the participants. Id.
158. Pollard, supra note 13, at 159. Groups which would continue to benefit from
government intervention in some form are the poor, the aged and the helpless. Id.
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Other critics of the Market Approach challenge the savings claims
of alternative delivery systems and question the adequacy of services
offered by new providers for seriously ill patients. 59 These questions
are largely unanswered, although limited experience with alternative
systems indicates a successful resolution of these issues. 60
Finally, certain critics object to applying market principles to
health care. They are concerned that social needs will be short-
changed and that the Market Approach will cause havoc in health
care delivery.'" However, this ideology no longer prevails. Concerns
for efficiency and affordability have been necessitated by decades of
persistent inflation in a sector which now accounts for ten percent of
the Gross National Product. The Market Approach proposal is a mani-
festation of these concerns. 62
B. Judicial and Statutory Support of the Market Approach
The Market Approach is based on expanding the influence of com-
petition in health care, thereby reducing price while maintaining or
improving quality. 63 In order to make competition effective, two
conditions must be met. First, innovative participants in the health
care market must enjoy more accessible market entry opportunities. 64
Second, the consumer must be given the incentive to cause providers
to tailor their services to meet consumer demand. 65 Recent court
decisions have supported both of these goals.166
159. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 895-96. These critics argue that savings
from alternative providers may be the result of "preferred case selection" whereby
healthy people would tend to select an HMO or other alternative provider for their
health care. Id. Others state that the health status of persons choosing traditional and
alternative health providers does not differ. Id. at 895 n.217.
160. Pollard, supra note 13, at 160-61 (alternative providers have accounted for
true savings).
161. Battistella & Eastaugh, Hospital Cost Containment, in REGULATING HEALTH
CARE, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 204 (A. Levin ed. 1980). This argument states that
societal and community needs are best met by formal planning rather than market
forces reflecting individual self interest. Id.
162. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
163. Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Industry, 12 AKRON L. REV.
417, 462-63 (1979) (policies supporting the proliferation of HMOs have these goals).
164. See notes 142-43 supra and accompanying text (market entry as a component
of the Market Approach).
165. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 895. Both factions of Market Approach
advocates agree that consumer power must be increased. They differ over the method
by which to achieve this result. Id. See generally notes 140-45 supra (discussion of the
two factions of the Market Approach).
166. See discussion at notes 171-220 infra (antitrust) & 221-29 infra (consent and
commercial free speech).
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The principal procompetitive economic policy statement is found in
the antitrust laws. 6 7 Antitrust analysis of the health care industry has
been a popular topic among commentators." 8 This section will discuss
recent antitrust decisions which may provide support for competitive
efforts which are opposed by entrenched provider inte'rests. 169 Finally,
the principal cases in the area of informed consent and freedom of
commercial speech will be examined. These doctrines afford con-
sumers the opportunity to gain access to personal medical information
and health care advertising. Their impact on Market Approach theo-
ries is significant. 171
167. Three statutes constitute the antitrust laws. They are the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), and Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976). The antitrust laws represent the
view that market competition is a proper technique of social control. P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 5 (1981).
168. A complete antitrust analysis of the health care industry is beyond the scope
of this Comment. For a more complete discussion see Borsody, supra note 163;
Boubjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care: An Overdrawn Dichot-
omy, 34 VAND. L. REV. 965 (1981) (discussion and comparison of the regulatory and
competitive approaches); Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health
Professions: Developing a Framework for Assessing Private Restraints, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 927 (1981) (antitrust analysis and its relation to procompetitive theories); Ri-
chard, Federal Antitrust Law and the Royal Drug Pharmacy Agreement: Implica-
tions for Formulating National Health Policy, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 233 (1981) (discus-
sion of the context and implications of the Royal Drug decision); Shapiro, Cost
Containment in the Health Care Field and the Antitrust Laws, 7 AM. J. L. & MED.
425 (1982) (discussion of recent case law developments); Symposium on the Antitrust
Laws and the Health Services Industry, 1978 DUKE L.J. 302 (comprehensive treat-
ment of antitrust and health care); Note, Antitrust and Health Care-Psychologists
Entitled to Blue Shield Reimbursement, 57 WASH. L. REV. 617 (1982) (cited for
discussion of historical development of antitrust application to health care); Note,
Antitrust Exemption Denied for Health Planning Regulations, 23 URB. L. ANN. 325
(1982) (emphasis on National Gerimedical decision); Note, Antitrust-Implied Repeal
of the Antitrust Laws by the National Health Planning Act, 56 TUL. L. REV. 749
(1982) (cited for the discussion of development of antitrust analysis of the health care
industry); Note, Health Law-The Conflict with Antitrust Law-National Gerimedical
Hospital & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 18 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 591 (1982) (emphasis on background and impact of National Gerimedical
decision); Note, Health Maintenance Organizations and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 437 (1982) (cited for discussion of potential antitrust liability
of HMOs).
169. Antitrust laws are designed to discourage anticompetitive conduct, encour-
age competition and maintain the structure of the marketplace to facilitate the
market process. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 908. See P. AREEDA, supra note
167, at 1-135 (discussion of the economic and legislative context for antitrust analy-
sis). Principal cases will be highlighted in this section. For referral to a complete
discussion of the topic see note 168 supra.
170. See notes 221-29 infra and accompanying text (discussion of judicial decisions
supporting increased consumer access to personal medical data and health care
advertising).
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1. Antitrust Developments
The health care industry has supported the idea that it should be
exempt from the procompetitive influence of antitrust law. Prior to
1975, this argument was largely successful1 7 1 due to the judicial ac-
ceptance of specific defenses such as the interstate commerce defense
and the learned professions exemption. 72 The state action exemp-
tion 73 and the business of insurance exemption 74 have also been used
to forestall antitrust scrutiny. 75
The interstate commerce defense provided that health services were
local transactions and did not affect interstate commerce, thus pre-
venting application of the Sherman Act.' 76 In 1976, the Supreme
Court in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital7 7 exam-
171. Note, Antitrust-Implied Repeal of the Antitrust Laws by the National Health
Planning Act, supra note 168, at 750; Note, Antitrust and Health Care-Psychologists
Entitled to Blue Shield Reimbursement, supra note 168, at 621.
172. Borsody, supra note 163, at 423.
173. Id. at 435. The theory of the state action exemption is that antitrust laws are
not needed in areas where substitute regulation is present. Id. See id. at 435-40
(discussion of the state action exemption).
The principal cases discussed are Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (regulation
of state industry is a local concern in absence of congressional legislation prohibiting
or regulating transactions affected by the state program), and Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (federal interest need not inevitably be subordinated
to the state's).
174. Borsody, supra note 163, at 440. The theory of the exemption is that the
business of insurance is exempt from the antitrust laws to the extent that state
regulation controls. Id. See id. at 440-47 (discussion of the business of insurance
exemption). For a discussion of the principal case, Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (pharmacy agreements between Blue Shield
and pharmacy for purpose of providing drugs at cost to Blue Shield policyholders
were not the business of insurance), see Richard, supra note 168.
175. See Note, Antitrust Exemption Denied for Health Planning Regulations,
supra note 168, at 325 n.5. Exemptions are based on the concept that Congress can
decide that regulation is preferable to competition in specific instances.
This section will discuss only the interstate commerce defense and the learned
professions exemption. See note 173 supra (state action exemption). See also note 174
supra (business of insurance exemption).
While the interstate commerce defense and the learned profession exemption have
been active judicial issues, they do not constitute the full range of health care
antitrust inquiry. See Richard, supra note 168, at 242-43 (shared purchasing agree-
ments and exclusive contracts are potential antitrust problems for health providers).
See also American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) (agreements not to advertise
declared unlawful).
176. St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n of New Orleans, Inc.,
510 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1975). The district court held that as a matter of law, "the
rendition of hospital services is a purely local activity." The plaintiff could not show
that restraint of this local activity substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. at
1123-24. The circuit court reversed. Id. at 1126.
177. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
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ined an antitrust allegation and found that the hospital's operations
did have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 7 Hospital
Building Company, a for-profit corporation, operated Mary Eliza-
beth Hospital, a forty-nine bed facility offering general medical and
surgical services to the public. Hospital Building alleged that three
trustees of Rex Hospital, a private tax exempt hospital, conspired to
block the relocation and expansion of Mary Elizabeth Hospital 79 for
the purpose of monopolizing paid medical and surgical services in
Raleigh, North Carolina. °80 Hospital Building alleged that numerous
areas of interstate commerce were affected,'' and the Supreme Court
agreed that a cause of action under the Sherman Act had been
stated. 182
Since Hospital Building it has been suggested that the era of modern
communication, mobile population and complex governmental and
financial interactions have made the interstate commerce defense in-
effective. 8 3 The defense has been sustained only in a narrow class of
cases involving suits by single medical practitioners against institu-
tional defendants. 8 4
The second major antitrust defense to suffer a significant setback is
the learned professions exemption. The leading case establishing this
exemption for the medical profession was the 1952 Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Oregon State Medical Society. 8 5 The
government charged that the defendant societies, corporation and
178. Id. at 739-40. The Supreme Court decision reversed two lower courts. The
district court and the Fourth Circuit had found that the provision of hospital services
was a local activity and the complaint did not allege a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Id. at 739.
179. Id. at 740. This conspiracy was alleged to have included delaying the state
authorization for expansion, instituting frivolous litigation and instigating the publi-
cation of adverse information about the expansion. Id. at 741.
180. Id.
181. Id. These allegations included claims that 80 % of the medicines and supplies
bought by the hospital came from out of state sellers, a substantial number of patients
were from out of state, insurance revenue was largely from out of state sources, the
hospital paid a management fee to its parent company (a Delaware corporation
based in Georgia), and finance plans totaling $4 million involved out of state lenders.
Id. at 741.
182. Id. at 747.
183. Borsody, supra note 163, at 428.
184. Id. at 425-28 (discussion of this class of cases). See Wolf v. Jane Phillips
Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684, 687 (10th Cir. 1975) (individual
practice of medicine is intrastate activity).
185. 343 U.S. 326 (1952). This case was cited as the leading case in Borsody, supra
note 5, at 429. An earlier case, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S.
643, 653 (1931), had stated that the medical profession was not a trade and therefore
not subject to trade regulation.
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doctors had conspired to restrain and monopolize the provision of
prepaid medical care in Oregon and restrain competition among doc-
tor-sponsored pre-paid medical plans within the state. '8 l In addressing
this charge, the District Court of Oregon stated that "[t]he sale of
medical services . . . is not trade or commerce within the meaning of
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Law .... ." The Supreme Court
agreed.8 7 The Court justified this exemption by citing ethical consid-
erations of the doctor-patient relationship which are outside the realm
of normal business activity regulated by the Sherman Act. 8
In 1975 the Supreme Court in Goldjarb v. Virginia State Bar 89
rejected the argument that learned professions should be excluded
from antitrust regulation.190 In Goldfarb, a couple sought a lawyer to
perform a title search in connection with the purchase of a home.' 9 '
They were unable to locate any attorney who would perform the
service for less than the minimum fee schedule published by the
Fairfax County Bar Association. 9 2 The couple brought a class action
alleging price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 93
The Supreme Court found that "[tihe nature of an occupation, stand-
ing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act." 194 The
Court cited American Medical Association v. United States,195 an
antitrust case involving medical practitioners, as support for the prop-
osition that sales of services have specifically been included in the
scope of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 96 In addition, the Court stated
that the public service characterization of professional practice does
not justify a section 1 exemption.197
186. 343 U.S. at 330.
187. Id. at 338 (citing the district court at 95 F. Supp. 103, 118 (D. Ore. 1950)).
188. Id. at 336. The Court may also have been influenced by the apparent reform
of the defendant medical society. Note, Antitrust and Health Care-Psychologists
Entitled to Blue Shield Reimbursement, supra note 168, at 621 n.32 (discussion of
both views on this "reforming" factor).
189. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
190. Id. at 787.
191. Only members of the Virginia State Bar were authorized to perform the
service. Id. at 775.
192. Id. at 776. The fee schedule was a list of recommended minimum prices for
common legal services. The State Bar had published reports and ethical opinions
supporting the use of fee schedules. Id. at 776-77.
193. Id. at 778.
194. Id. at 787.
195. 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (the AMA adopted "rules of ethics" which violated the
Sherman Act by discouraging physicians from participating in or consulting with
Group Health Association).
196. 421 U.S. at 787.
197. Id. This position was qualified, however, by a footnote which stated that
professions may not always be interchangeable with businesses for purposes of the
Sherman Act. The Court stated: "It would be unrealistic to ... automatically ...
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After Goldfarb, the Supreme Court in 1978 found that a profes-
sional engineers' association's canon of ethics violated the Sherman
Act. 198 The canon had been adopted for the purpose of minimizing the
risk that competition would produce inferior engineering work and
endanger the public safety.1 99 The Supreme Court decided that this
consideration did not allow the engineers to refrain from discussing
project fees until after jobs were accepted. 20 0
While the Supreme Court did cite American Medical Association as
an illustration that professional services are not immune from anti-
trust examination, the Court has not ruled specifically on the medical
learned professions exemption. Lower courts, however, have held that
the GoldJarb restriction on the learned professions defense does apply
to medicine. The Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that the
medical status of physicians and dentists does not remove them from
the scope of the antitrust laws.20 1 In other circuits, plaintiffs have
successfully alleged antitrust causes of action against medical practi-
tioners. In these cases, the defendants did not attempt to use the
learned professions exemption. 20 2 Moreover, recent successful medical
antitrust defenses have not relied on a learned professions theory. 20 3
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas." Id. at
788 n. 17.
198. National Soc'y of Professional Engr's v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
199. Id. at 681.
200. Id. at 682-83.
201. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d
476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (conspiracy found where
psychologists were forced to bill Blue Shield only through physicians); Ballard v. Blue
Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976) (denial of insurance coverage
to chiropractors stated facts within federal court jurisdiction of the Sherman Act;
professional status of physicians offered no defense); Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982) (exclusive contract between hospital and
professional medical association for anesthesia services was an illegal tying arrange-
ment); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 552-53
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979) (center with abortion clinic
brought federal and state antitrust action against physician); Boddicker v. Arizona
State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 630-32 (9th Cir. 1977) (learned professions exemp-
tion does not apply to dentists where an association required membership in national
dental association as condition precedent to membership in local dental association).
202. Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977) (antitrust
cause of action was stated where suit charged that four insurance companies con-
spired to reduce malpractice coverage available to Rhode Island doctors through the
medium of a boycott); American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d
443 (2d Cir. 1980) (A.M.A. violated the F.T.C. Act when it took coordinated action
to restrain advertising and solicitation); Bogus v. American Speech Hearing Ass'n,
582 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1978) (speech pathologist stated cause of action under Sherman
Act where plaintiff challenged tying arrangement whereby association membership
was a prerequisite to applying for, receiving and retaining a certificate of clinical
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A difficulty with health care antitrust analysis is that it is a double-
edged sword. It restricts anticompetitive conduct on the part of associ-
ations and competing providers and assists in establishing new pro-
viders. 20 4 However, it may also defeat some potential cost
containment strategies.
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,20 5 members of a
medical society and an insurance company constructed and published
a maximum fee schedule.206 The Supreme Court found the schedules
to be price fixing and a violation of the Sherman Act. 20 7 In applying
the per se rule against price fixing, the Court thus restricted the cost
containment efforts of the insurer, 208 notwithstanding the public ben-
efit of reducing health care expenditures. 20 9
competence); Williams v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980) (cause of
action under the federal antitrust laws was stated where plaintiff alleged that doctors
in and around Joliet, Illinois were engaged in a conspiracy to refuse to treat any
person or family member of any person who had instituted a malpractice suit against
any doctor in the area); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715
(10th Cir. 1980) (pathologist stated claim for relief under the Sherman Act where he
alleged that defendant and others had conspired to limit competition and fix prices in
practice of pathology).
203. Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir.
1982) (substantial foreclosure of competition in relevent market not shown where
exclusive contract for hospital anesthesia services was challenged); Federal Prescrip-
tion Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(lobbying efforts of pharmacists and national associations of retail druggists were not
a conspiracy to harm mail order pharmacy and did not violate antitrust laws).
204. Health Maintenance Organizations have been the victim of anticompetitive
efforts aimed at restricting their development. In 1943 the American Medical Associ-
ation conspired to discourage physicians from utilizing Group Health Association, an
organization engaging in a group medical practice. American Medical Ass'n v.
United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). See Kissam, Health Maintenance Organizations
and the Role of Antitrust Law, 1978 DuKE L.J. 487, 493-99. HMOs have also faced
charges of promoting unethical medicine, refusals to deal with HMO physicians and
negative statements about HMOs by state and county medical societies. Id. See also
Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737
(1951) (exclusion of HMO physicians from county medical society and hospitals and
refusals to deal with HMO physicians).
205. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
206. Id. at 2470-71.
207. Id. at 2475. The Court noted: "We have not wavered in our enforcement of
the per se rule against price fixing." Id. Maximum fees are as improper as minimum
fees because the maximum fee quickly evolves into an actual uniform minimum fee.
Id. at 2474-75.
208. The Court emphasized that some price fixing arrangements appear to be
reasonable, but the aim and result of every price fixing agreement is to eliminate one
form of competition. Id. at 2473. Therefore, the error in Maricopa was the method of
cost containment, not the concept of reducing costs.
209. The dissent emphasized the public benefit of the Maricopa plan. Id. at 2480-
85 (Powell, J. dissenting). The dissent noted that the Maricopa plan is a new method
of providing medical services which does not involve coercion and seems to be in the
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Further limitations were imposed on the cost containment efforts of
insurers in National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross of Kansas City. 210 The Supreme Court held that a plan of
health regulations promulgated by Blue Cross and designed to control
the distribution of new hospital construction was not immune from
antitrust scrutiny. 211 In National Gerimedical, a private hospital was
denied a Certificate of Need from a local planning agency. 21 2 Based on
this denial, Blue Cross refused to include the new facility in its 100%
reimbursement program .213 As a result of being excluded from the
program, National Gerimedical would receive only eighty percent
reimbursement.2 1 4 The Court decided to bar Blue Cross from enforc-
ing the policy of the National Health Planning and Resources Devel-
opment Act of 1974.215 This decision may actually thwart congressio-
nal intent to limit unneeded expansion. 216 The National Gerimedical
and Maricopa decisions are two restrictions on the use of insurance
public interest. Id. at 2480. Since the medical society "serves as an effective cost
containment mechanism that has saved patients and insurers millions of dollars [it
arguably does not violate the Sherman Act, which is] a law designed to benefit
consumers." Id. at 2481 (emphasis in original). The dissent argued that in the
absence of a complete factual record, the Court should not condemn a novel practice
which may have substantial consumer benefits. Id. at 2485. But see id. at 2472-75
(discussion of the application of the per se rule against price fixing to this case).
210. 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
211. Id. at 393. The Court held that this immunity fails regardless of the proper
motive of Blue Cross in seeking to implement the congressional legislative intent to
avoid duplication of hospital services. Id. at 391.
212. Id. at 380-81. The Certificate of Need process is part of a statutory plan to
prevent unneeded capital expenditures in health facilities. Id. at 383-88. See notes
90-93 supra (discussion of CON programs).
213. 452 U.S. at 381. Blue Cross policy was to exclude a new hospital if it could
not show it was meeting "a clearly evident need for health care in a defined service
area." Id. at 381. Blue Cross relied on a local "health systems agency" set up
according to the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974
to make this determination. Id.
214. Id. at 380. In addition, the reduced payments are made directly to the
subscriber rather than to the hospital. Id.
215. 452 U.S. at 388-91. Blue Cross claimed implied antitrust immunity because
its policy promoted congressional intent. The Court stated that Congress did not
intend the private company to enforce limitations on unneeded hospital expansion.
Id. at 391. The Court also emphasized that Congress expected health systems agency
planning to be implemented through persuasion and cooperation rather than through
compulsion. Id.
216. See Note, Health Law-The Conflict with Antitrust Law-National Gerirnedi-
cal Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, supra note 168, at 607.
Observers have noted that the construction of hospital beds in Missouri has become
uncontrollable. As many as 1,000 current beds may be unnecessary by 1987. In
addition, the threat of antitrust liability has restricted Blue Cross's ability to assist in
cost containment through the Certificate of Need Program. Id.
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companies as enforcement mechanisms for cost containment. This is a
setback for the Market Approach because insurance companies possess
substantial purchasing power and thus could assist in implementing a
competitive approach . 2 17
Some alternative providers such as Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions, which have borne the burden of anticompetitive practices in the
past, 218 may find themselves to be potential violators of the antitrust
laws in the future. As HMOs grow in size and market power, their
antitrust exposure increases. In addition, aggressive business practices
by a small alternative provider could be viewed as an effort to reduce
competition once that provider has become a major market force. 21 9
Moreover, if national health organizations acquire local HMOs, the
potential concentration of market share may lead to charges of a
tendency to monopolize the HMO segment of the health care mar-
ket. 220
2. Consent and Commercial Free Speech
Judicial support of the Market Approach can also be found outside
the boundaries of antitrust analysis. Developments in the doctrines of
informed consent and commercial speech have increased consumer
access to information. Such access is essential if consumers are to have
a stronger voice in determining the quality and price of a provider's
services.22'
The doctrine of informed consent has traditionally relied upon the
judgment of the doctor to decide what information should be pro-
vided to the patient. 222 In 1972, however, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court rejected the traditional professionally controlled stan-
dard and substituted a legal standard. 223 The court determined that
217. See notes 156-57 supra and accompanying text (discussion of consumer power
through group purchasing).
218. See note 204 supra (discussion of anticompetitive practices used against
HMOs)..
219. See Note, Health Maintenance Organizations and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, supra note 168, at 442 (discusses possibility of reduced competition between
HMOs and private providers or among HMOs themselves).
220. See id. at 441-43 (potential violations of the antitrust laws by HMOs).
221. See notes 154-58 supra (discussing the role of consumers in a competitive
health care market).
222. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 902-08, citing J. KING, THE LAW OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 136 (1977).
223. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972) (patient submitted to spinal operation and later suffered significant paralysis).
The court determined that the law, and not the individual doctors, would control the
standard. The Canterbury approach represents important support for the Market
Approach. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 9, at 907. Pollard has identified this same
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true consent is rooted in choice and such choice is not possible without
knowledge of the available options and risks. 224 The court determined
that the patient is capable of making an intelligent decision provided
he is adequately informed and has discussed the situation with his
doctor .225
Additional judicial support of the consumer's right to information
was set forth in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.226 The Supreme Court held that consumers
have a first amendment right to receive commercial speech in the
form of advertising. 227 A Virginia statute made the advertising of
prescription drug prices unprofessional conduct for the'state's lis-
censed pharmacists. 228 The Court held that commercial speech is not
wholly outside the constitutional protections because both the individ-
ual and society have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial
information. 22
9
While some judicial decisions such as Maricopa County and Na-
tional Gerimedical limit the permissible activities in cost containment
efforts, the courts have provided significant support to the competitive
theory underlying the Market Approach. Direct support is evident in
antitrust decisions such as Hospital Building and Goldfarb. Recent
developments in the doctrines of informed consent and commercial
speech have increased consumer awareness and support for the Mar-
ket Approach theory. The Market Approach will need additional
judicial support in the future if its cost containment efforts are to be
implemented.
VI. Current Treatment of Tax Exempt Health Care Financing
Under the Internal Revenue Code
There are no specific Internal Revenue Code provisions granting tax
exempt status to financings of health care facilities in general or
trend toward placing responsibility for health care expenditures with the consumers.
Pollard, supra note 13, at 159.
224. 464 F.2d at 780.
225. Id. at 782. The court went on to note that, "it must be the exceptional patient
who cannot comprehend such an explanation at least in a rough way." Id. at 782
n.27.
226. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
227. Id. at 756. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In the context
of prohibitions on attorney advertising, the Court further stated that any justification
which is based on the benefits of public ignorance is questionable. Id.
228. 425 U.S. at 749-50.
229. Id. at 761-65. Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that in considering a
balance between free speech and public welfare, the interests of public welfare were
strong in this case. Id. at 788-89. The dissent noted that consumers could obtain the
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hospitals in particular. The interest on bonds issued for the benefit of
health care facilities will be taxable unless certain exemption criteria
can be met. 230 These criteria are significantly more favorable for
health care facilities which qualify as exempt persons under section
501 (c)(3) 231 than for those facilities which cannot qualify as exempt
persons. 232 This section will discuss the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code which determine the tax status of interest on bonds
issued for use by health care facilities. 233 In addition, this section will
examine current standards of the charitable exemption. 234
A. Financing Provisions
Section 103(a) states that interest on the obligations of certain gov-
ernmental units including political subdivisions of those units will be
exempt from federal income taxation. 235 Treasury Regulation section
information by phone or in person, so the statute was not a restriction of the right to
receive the information. Id. at 782 n.*.
230. The general rule is that income is subject to taxation unless there is an
applicable exemption. See notes 254-56 infra and accompanying text (exemptions
from the tax laws are narrowly construed).
231. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). The section states:
(c) List of Exempt Organizations.-The following organizations are re-
ferred to in subsection (a): ... (3) Corporations, and any community
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educa-
tional purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports com-
petition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence
legislation, (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distrib-
uting of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate
for public office.
Section 501(a) (1976) reads: "An organization described in subsection (c) . . . shall be
exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such exemption is denied under
section 502 or 503." Section 502 states that for-profit "feeder organizations" will not
be exempt merely because the profits are payable to an exempt organization. I.R.C.
§ 502(a) (1976). Section 503 states that exempt organizations cannot participate in
certain "prohibited transactions." I.R.C. § 503(a)(1) (1976).
232. For a discussion of the use of bond financing by both exempt and non-exempt
health care facilities, see notes 235-53 infra and accompanying text.
233. See notes 235-53 infra and accompanying text.
234. See notes 254-99 infra and accompanying text.
235. I.R.C. § 103(a) (1976). The section states:
SEC. 103. INTEREST ON CERTAIN GOVERNMENTAL OBLIGA-
TIONS.
(a) General rule.-Gross income does not include interest on-
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1.103-1'(b) states that obligations issued by authorities empowered to
issue such obligations are included in the scope of section 103(a). 236
Therefore, state or local hospital authorities237 can issue tax exempt
obligations.
Section 103(b) discusses "Industrial Development Bonds" which are
taxable obligations under section 103(b)(1). 238 Section 103(b)(2) de-
fines the characteristics of an industrial development bond 239 and
states that any person who is an exempt person under section 103(b)(3)
can avoid taxable status for their bonds. 240 Section 103(b)(3) states
that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) 241 can use bond
proceeds without those bonds being considered industrial develop-
ment bonds. 242 Therefore, by avoiding the taxable status which ac-
companies the designation as an industrial development bond, the
section 501(c)(3) organization can benefit from tax exempt bonds
(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United
States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the
District of Columbia ....
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(b) (1972).
237. For a discussion of hospital authorities, see notes 114-15 supra and accompa-
nying text.
238. I.R.C. § 103(b)(1) (1976). The section states:
(b) Industrial Development Bonds.-
(1)Subsection (a)(1) or (2) not to apply.-Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this subsection, any industrial development bond shall be treated
as an obligation not described in subsection (a)(1) or (2).
239. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2) (1976). The section states:
(2) Industrial development bond.-For purposes of this section, the
term 'industrial development bond' means any obligation-
(A) which is issued as part of an issue all or a major portion of the
proceeds of which are to be used directly or indirectly in any trade or
business carried on by any person who is not an exempt person (within the
meaning of paragraph (3)), and
(B) the payment of the principal or interest on which (under the terms
of such obligation or any underlying arrangement) is, in whole or in major
part-
(i) secured by any interest in property used or to be used in a trade
or business or in payments in respect of such property, or
(ii) to be derived from payments in respect of property, or bor-
rowed money, used or to be used in a trade or business.
240. Id. § 103(b)(2)(A).
241. See note 231 supra.
242. I.R.C. § 103(b)(3) (1976). The section states:
(3) Exempt person.-For purposes of paragraph (2)(A), the term 'exempt person'
means
(A) a governmental unit, or
(B) an organization described in section 501(c)(3) and exempt from
tax under section 501(a) (but only with respect to a trade or business
carried on by such organization which is not an unrelated trade or busi-
ness, determined by applying section 513(a) to such organization).
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issued by a hospital authority "on behalf of" a qualified governmental
unit. 243
Hospitals which cannot qualify as section 501(c)(3) organizations
are confronted with a narrow tax exempt financing option. The obli-
gations of these organizations will fit the definition of industrial devel-
oprnent bonds as set forth in section 103(b)(2). 2" Therefore, under
section 103(b)(1) the interest on these obligations will be taxable. 245
The tax exempt financing advantage offered by hospital authority
financing will not be available to these non-section 501(c) (3) organiza-
tions. 246 The remaining option for these non-exempt organizations is
to qualify their financing as an exemption from the industrial develop-
ment bond category.2 47 Section 103(b)(4) lists certain exempt activities
which do not include hospitals and health care facilities. 248 An addi-
tional exemption possibility is the small issue exemption under section
103(b)(6). 24' This section allows an exemption for up to $1 million of
243. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C. B. 24 expands on the I.R.S. position set forth in
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1, supra note 236, by stating five requirements which must be
satisfied before a nonprofit corporation (hospital authority) will be able to issue
obligations "on behalf of" a state or political subdivision. They are:
(1) the corporation must engage in activities which are essentially public
in nature; (2) the corporation must be one which is not organized for profit
(except to the extent of retiring indebtedness); (3) the corporate income
must not inure to any private person; (4) the state or a political subdivision
thereof must have a beneficial interest in the corporation while the indebt-
edness remains outstanding and it must obtain full legal title to the prop-
erty of the corporation with respect to which the indebtedness was in-
curred upon the retirement of such indebtedness; and (5) the corporation
must have been approved by the state or a political subdivision thereof,
either of which must also have approved the specific obligations issued by
the corporation.
Hospitals and health care organizations which have attained § 501 (c)(3) status will
not violate these requirements.
244. See note 239 supra.
245. See note 238 supra.
246. See R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, supra note 104, at 187-88. The authors note,
"the private, full-profit hospitals are only allowed to issue up to $10 million in tax-
exempt bonds to finance capital additions." Id. at 187. The other three types of
hospitals, federal government hospitals, state and municipal hospitals and not-for-
profit hospitals, can finance their capital needs through either federal taxes or tax-
exempt revenue bonds. Id. at 187-88. See Rev. Rul. 63-20, supra note 243 (for-profit
health care facilities could not satisfy the five requirements necessary to utilize a
hospital authority).
247. See notes 248-49 infra (discussion of these exemptions).
248. I.R.C. § 103(b)(4) (1976, Supp. 11 1978, Supp. III 1979, Supp. IV 1980,
Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1982). This section includes exemptions for qualified
rental properties, sports facilities, convention facilities, airports, docks, waste dis-
posal facilities, pollution control facilities, etc. Hospitals or health care facilities are
not included in the list.
249. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(A) (1976). The section states:
(6) Exemption for certain small issues.-
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bonds for use by a restricted class which may include qualifying
hospitals. 250 The ceiling can be increased to $10 million in certain
cases. 251 The limitations on raising the ceiling are connected to meth-
ods of computing the value of the bond issue. For the purposes of
section 103(b)(6), bond issues for three years on each side of the
subject bond issue are aggregated in reaching the $10 million maxi-
mum 252
While the $1 million and $10 million provisions of section 103(b)(6)
have been utilized by hospitals, the capital needs of the health care
industry require a larger source of financing.2 53 Tax exempt hospital
revenue bonds issued by a state or local authority for the benefit of a
hospital are only availiable to organizations which qualify as section
501(c)(3) exempt organizations. Health organizations which operate
for profit do not have this option because they do not qualify as a
religious, charitable, scientific, or educational organization under sec-
tion 501(c)(3).
B. Exemption Provisions
The Supreme Court has stated clearly that exemptions from the tax
laws are to be narrowly construed by the courts. In HCSC Laundry v.
(A) In general.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any obligation
issued as part of an issue the aggregate authorized face amount of which is
$1,000,000 or less and substantially all of the proceeds of which are to be
used (i) for the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, or improvement
of land or property of a character subject to the allowance for deprecia-
tion, or (ii) to redeem part or all of a prior issue which was issued for
purposes described in clause (i) or this clause. ...
250. Substantially all of the proceeds of the $1 million issue must be used, "(i) for
the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, or improvement of land or property of
a character subject to the allowance for depreciation, or (ii) to redeem part or all of a
prior issue which was issued for purposes described in clause (i) or this clause."
I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(A). See note 249 supra.
251. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D) (1976 & Supp. 111978). Explanations of the criteria for
the $10 million ceiling are found in § 103(b)(6)(E)-(I) (1976, Supp. 111978, Supp. III
1979, Supp. IV 1980, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1982). See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-10
(1977) (discussion of the small issues exemption).
252. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D)(ii) (1976). The section states:
(ii) in determining the aggregate face amount of such issue, by taking
into account not only the amount described in subparagraph (B), but also
the aggregate amount of capital expenditures with respect to facilities
described in subparagraph (E) paid or incurred during the 6-year period
beginning 3 years before the date of such issue and ending 3 years after
such date (and financed otherwise than out of the proceeds of outstanding
issues to which subparagraph (A) applied), as if the aggregate amount of
such capital expenditures constituted the face amount of a prior outstand-
ing issue described in subparagraph (B).
253. See note 131 supra and accompanying text (discussion of the capital needs of
the health care industry).
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United States,25 4 a hospital service organization was denied an exemp-
tion under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3). 255 The Court noted that, "[u]nder
our system of taxation . . . every element of gross income of a person,
corporate or individual, is subject to tax unless there is a statute or
some rule of law that exempts that person or element. 256
Moreover, courts also have been explicit in limiting the use of tax
exemptions to their narrowly defined purpose. In Kirkpatrick v.
United States,2 57 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of the use of
proceeds of a tax exempt bond issue offered for a hospital. In Kirkpa-
trick, interest on the bonds was held to be taxable because a major
portion of the benefit of the bond issue was used in the trade or
business of persons who were not exempt persons. 258 The hospital built
an office building but a major portion of the building's subtenants
were not exempt. 25 The court found that the legislative intent of
sections 103, 501 and 513,260 when considered together, was to assure
that exempt organizations could not be used as conduits to enable non-
exempt persons to receive benefits arising from the use of bond pro-
ceeds in their trade or business. 26'
The Internal Revenue Service has established four requirements
which a hospital must fulfill to comply with section 501(c) (3).262 First,
the hospital must be organized as a nonprofit charitable organization
for the purpose of operating a hospital for the care of the sick. 263
254. 450 U.S. 1 (1981).
255. The exemption was denied under § 501(c)(3) because this cooperative service
organization was specifically controlled by another Code section, § 501(e). In addi-
tion, the legislative history of § 501(e) was specific in stating that these organizations
were not subject to a § 501(c)(3) exemption. 450 U.S. at 6-7.
256. Id. at 5.
257. 605 F.2d 1160 (10th Cir. 1979).
258. Id. at 1161, 1163. The hospital used tax exempt bonds to lease an office
building. The hospital then subleased the offices to nonexempt persons. Id. at 1161.
259. Id.
260. I.R.C. § 513(a) (1976) (stating general rule for determining what is an
unrelated trade or business). This section provides that any trade or business which is
not substantially related to the organization's charitable or other exempt purpose is
an unrelated trade or business. I.R.C. § 511(a) (Supp. II 1978) imposes a tax on
unrelated business income of charitable and other exempt organizations.
261. 605 F.2d at 1162. The Conference Committee Report on what is now I.R.C.
§ 103(b)(2) stated that an obligation is an industrial development bond and thus
taxable if all or a major portion of its proceeds "are to be used to construct facilities to
be leased to any person who will in turn lease them to another person who is not an
exempt person for use in a trade or business carried on by him ...... CONF. REP. No.
1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2373,
2381.
262. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202, as modified by Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2
C.B. 117. See note 263 infra (discussion of Rev. Rul. 69-545).
263. The mere fact that one maintains a hospital does not ensure that the first
requirement will be met. Sometimes more than the diagnosis and cure of disease is
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Second, the hospital must be operated for the care of all persons in the
community who are able to pay the cost, either directly or through
third party reimbursement.2 64 Third, the hospital must not restrict the
use of its facilities to a particular group of physicians and surgeons to
the exclusion of all other qualified doctors. 265 Fourth, the hospital
necessary for a health facility to qualify as a charitable organization. Sonora Com-
munity Hosp. v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.), aff'g 46 T.C. 519, 525-26
(1966) (the community hospital operated to a substantial degree for the benefit of the
founding doctors and the amount of free health care rendered was less than one
percent of paid care. Charitable contributions may be relatively low but serious
questions are raised where the contributions are inconsequential).
In Revenue Ruling 69-545 the I.R.S. set forth certain characteristics' for both
exempt and non-exempt hospitals. "Hospital A" was declared exempt. Among its
characteristics were: (1) a Board of Trustees composed of prominent members of the
community, (2) facilities available to all qualified physicians in the area consistent
with the size of the facility, (3) leases of medical office space at reasonable rates, (4)
referrals of persons who could not pay their expenses to another hospital in the
community which serves indigents, and (5) excess funds applied to expand and repair
facilities and equipment, amortize debt, improve patient care, and provide medical
training, education and research. In contrast, "Hospital B" was refused tax exempt
status. Among its characteristics were (1) the Board of Trustees was limited to five
doctors, their lawyer and accountant, (2) applications of many qualified doctors in
the community for staff privileges had been rejected, (3) admissions were ordinarily
limited to those who could pay for the services, (4) the hospital operated a relatively
inactive emergency room and encouraged ambulance services to take patients else-
where, and (5) the rentals paid by Board of Trustee member doctors for office space
in the hospital were less than those paid for other office space in the community. Rev.
Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117-18.
264. Originally, the charitable hospital had to provide free or below cost service to
those unable to pay. Rev. Rul. 56-185. This was modified to state that a hospital
could qualify as tax exempt by promoting the health of those in the community who
could pay and by providing free emergency service. Rev. Rul. 69-545. This has been
called the Community Benefit Approach. Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 158, 181 (1978) (Health Maintenance Organization held to serve a public
interest. HMO not engaged in a form of insurance and is therefore organized and
operated exclusively for charitable purposes. HMO qualifies as a § 501(c)(3) organi-
zation).
The Commissioner acquiesced in the Tax Court decision relating to the issue of
whether Sound Health Associates, "which provides health care services to its mem-
bers on a prepaid basis, and to nonmembers on a fee for service basis is exempt from
federal income tax under § 501(a) . . . as an organization described in § 501(c)(3) or
whether it serves the private interests of its members and therefore is not operated
exclusively for charitable purposes." 1981-2 C.B. 4 n.36.
The IRS cautions that acquiescence in a decision means acceptance of the conclu-
sion reached and not necessarily the reasons assigned by the court for its conclusions.
1981-2 C.B. 1. The constitutionality of Rev. Rul. 69-545 has been upheld. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated
and remanded, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). Several low income individuals and organizations
representing such individuals claimed that Rev. Rul. 69-545 encouraged the denial of
services to indigents. The circuit court upheld Rev. Rul. 69-545 on the merits and the
Supreme Court found lack of standing.
265. In Sonora Community Hospital, this standard was not met. 46 T.C. 519
(1966), aff'd per curiam, 397 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1968). The hospital was found to be
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must not permit any of its earnings to directly or indirectly benefit any
private shareholder or individual. 266
"operated to a substantial degree for the benefit of its founding doctors, who together
with their associates were the source of 90 % of the patients treated at the hospital,
and who through private arrangements with the Ruckers were the beneficiaries of
one third of the gross receipts of the X-ray department and clinical laboratory which
the Ruckers operated at the hospital." 46 T.C. at 526.
266. It is also clear that an organization does not serve a private interest merely
because it pays a reasonable salary to its manager, officers or employees. B.H.W.
Anesthesia Found., 72 T.C. 681, 685 (1979). In B.H.W., the court examined a
corporation affiliated with the Boston School for Women and Harvard Medical
School, both of which were exempt under § 501(c)(3). The members of the Founda-
tion provide all their services to the department of anesthesiology. A large part of the
receipts is applied toward the physicians' salaries. Id. at 682-83. The court found that
the Foundation was not merely the incorporation of the members' private medical
practice. Id. at 687. Rather, the payments were reasonable salaries within the
context of a case where the anesthesiology department of an otherwise exempt
hospital had incorporated. The Foundation was found to be continuing to serve the
hospital patients and applying its operating revenues toward the purpose and for the
benefit of the hospital generally. 72 T.C. at 687. In University of Mass. Medical
School Group Practice, 74 T.C. 1299 (1980) the court reached a similar result. Group
Practice was created to serve as a component of the University of Massachusetts
Medical School and its teaching hospital. Id. at 1301. Faculty members of the school
participated in a clinical program in which the Group Practice collected fees and
deposited them in a trust. The trust paid the salaries and non-cash benefits of the
members of the Group Practice, with the salary determined by the trustees of the
University of Massachusetts. Id. at 1301-03. The court held that the IRS had erred in
failing to rule that Group Practice was a § 501(c)(3) organization. Contrary to the
IRS interpretation, the main purpose of Group Practice was not to collect fees for
services rendered by the doctors and then return the fees to them. Id. at 1305.
Rather, the court cited BHW Anesthesia Found. in determining that the salaries paid
were reasonable. Id. at 1306. The payment of reasonable salaries does not defeat the
exemption of an otherwise exempt organization. Id.
The concept of reasonable salaries is distinguished from cases where participants in
an organization derived substantial private benefit from their affiliation. In Balti-
more Regional Joint Bd. Health & Welfare Fund, 69 T.C. 554 (1978), employees of a
fund which operated child day care centers and provided physical examinations were
charged lower rates than "public" children. The court held that the Fund was not a §
501(c)(3) organization operated exclusively for charitable purposes because a sub-
stantial portion (24%) of its receipts were returned to members in the form of
medical benefits. Id. at 557-58. Similarly, in Lorain Ave. Clinic, 31 T.C. 141 (1958)
the court held that the clinic was not operated for charitable purposes because the
doctors associated with the clinic were the only beneficiaries of its operation. In
addition, the clinic failed to produce records of the number of patients who received
free or below cost medical care. Id. at 159-60. See Sonora Community Hosp., 46
T.C. 519 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 397 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1968) (community hospital
operated for the benefit of the founding doctor).
The concept of "reasonable" salaries has also been applied in determinations
concerning facilities owned by an exempt person and operated by a nonexempt
management company, Rev. Proc. 82-14, 1982-1 C.B. 459, or non-exempt person,
Rev. Proc. 82-15, 1982-1 C.B. 460. In these cases, the IRS position is that any
management contract or contract with a non-exempt person must be based on
compensation which is reasonable in relation to the services performed. Further,
increases may not be excessive and the IRS suggests using the Consumer Price Index
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The I.R.S. discussion of exempt health care financing has focused
on hospitals. The I.R.S. has not specifically addressed alternative
delivery systems, but the experience of Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions is a valuable guide. HMOs were given specific congressional
encouragement by the Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973,267 yet the I.R.S. maintained a hostile position regarding exami- -
nations of tax exempt status and seriously hindered the natural growth
of these organizations.2 68 In 1978, an HMO named Sound Health
as a standard for determining increases. Rev. Proc. 82-14, supra, Rev. Proc. 82-15,
supra.
The Tax Court has determined that if the founder of a hospital maintains his
private offices at the hospital for his private medical practice, this is not necessarily a
violation of the exemption criteria. R.C. Olney, 17 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 982,
23.265(M), T.C. Memo 1958-200 (1958). In Olney, a foundation constructed a
hospital which it operated for the benefit of any staff members who wished to join
while not denying admission to any patient regardless of ability to pay. The hospital
was held to be exempt. Id. at 992. But cf. Lowry Hospital Ass'n, 66 T.C. 850 (1976),
where the hospital failed to show that the integration of the founding doctor's
medical practice with the operations of the hospital did not inure to the benefit of the
founding physician. Id. at 860. In Lowry, the corporation made loans to the physi-
cian. The court found that the loans were not in the corporation's best interests and
would not have been made in the absence of the special relationship. Id. at 858-59.
The transaction was not at arms length. Id. However, where the transaction is at
arms length, a hospital's exempt status will not be lost where it enters into an
agreement with a hospital-based radiologist providing for compensation based on a
fixed percentage of the departmental income. Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113.
A hospital may also charge fees to its doctor staff under certain conditions where
the purpose of such fees is to raise money to build a new hospital. The fees may be
required, but may not be unreasonable in amount or discriminatory in application.
Rev. Rul. 65-269, 1965-2 C.B. 159.
267. 12 U.S.C. § 1721; 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 note, 280c, 300e to 300e-14, 2001 (1976).
The Act provided HEW financial support for feasibility studies, planning and devel-
opment. See Bromberg, Obtaining a 501(c)(3) Exemption for an HMO Should Be
Easier Now Despite IRS Objections, J. TAX'N., Nov. 1979, at 302 (discussion of
exemptions for HMOs); see also note 45 supra and accompanying text (discussion of
the definition of a Health Maintenance Organization); notes 119-21 supra and ac-
companying text (discussion of HMOs and their relationship to tax exempt financ-
ing).
268. Bromberg, supra note 267, at 302. The IRS had granted § 501(c)(4) (1976)
exemptions (organizations operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare) to
HMOs but its unpublished general position for 30 years had been to deny a §
501(c)(3) exemption. This is particularly damaging to health care organizations
because it deprives them of potential support from private foundations, corporations
and individual donors. Such donations are typically made under I.R.C. § 170(a)(1)
(1976) (deductions for charitable contributions and gifts). Contributions to §
501(c)(3) organizations are deductible; contributions to § 501(c)(4) organizations are
not deductible. Id.
In spite of this general position, as many as 10 % of the HMOs received § 501(c)(3)
exemptions anyway, probably because of (1) a distinct orientation toward providing
services to indigents through the use of federal funds or (2) close association with a
university health, education and research program. Id.
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Association challenged an I.R.S. denial of section 501(c)(3) status.2 69
The Tax Court held for the HMO. 7° Significantly, the court applied
the hospital standards of the section 501(c)(3) qualification to deter-
mine if the HMO should receive section 501(c)(3) status. The court
stated, "[h]aving determined without difficulty that the rendering of
medical care is a charitable activity, it is reasonable to conclude that
the tests applied to determine the status of a hospital are relevant to a
determination of the status of an HMO. Clearly, both types of organi-
zations must qualify as charitable under 501(c)(3) on the basis of the
health care services that they provide. ' 271 The same could be said of
any other type of alternative delivery system. 272
If an alternative delivery system is examined under the hospital
criteria, it must attain a "charitable" designation to qualify for ex-
empt status. This will be difficult because the I.R.S. has applied the
charitable exemption criteria strictly. In Federation Pharmacy Serv-
ices273 the petitioner was a nonprofit corporation which operated a
pharmacy for the purpose of selling drugs at a discounted cost to
elderly and handicapped persons. 27 4 The Tax Court held that the
Federation failed to show that it was operated exclusively for charita-
269. 71 T.C. 158 (1978).
270. Id. at 191. See note 264 supra (Commissioner acquiesced to the decision in
1981). Hospitals have utilized tax exempt bonds to build facilities which offer services
similiar to those offered by HMOs. See, e.g., Lttr. Rul. 8208200, Nov. 30, 1981
(bonds to provide facilities for hospital-sponsored, direct service health care on a
prepaid basis). Private letter rulings may not be cited as precedent. I.R.C. §
6110(j)(3) (1976).
271. 71 T.C. at 178-79.
272. Courts had previously analogized nursing homes to hospitals when con-
fronted with the issue of their tax exempt charitable status. Evangelical Lutheran
Good Samaritan Soc'y v. County of Gage, 181 Neb. 831, 836, 151 N.W.2d 446, 449
(1967) (property used for nursing home exempt from taxation because the home is
operated by a nonprofit corporation which does qualify as a charitable institution).
The question of what is a health care institution has also been the subject of
debate. In North Suburban Blood Center v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1981), the
Board claimed that the blood bank was not a health care institution and thus was not
subject to provisions of the National Labor Relations Act which minimized disrup-
tion of patient care services. The court found that although blood banks need not
automatically be classified as health care institutions, id. at 635, this blood bank was
such an institution because it was integrally related to the hospitals it served. Id. at
637.
273. 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980).
274. Id. at 805. The record failed to describe the exact criteria for obtaining a card
which would allow purchases of the drugs at a discount. However, Federation did
identify its goal of selling its drugs at a 5 % discount from the lowest price found in an
area survey to be conducted periodically. All customers, however, would be required
to pay for their drugs. Significantly, no guarantees of sales below cost or distribution
of free drugs to indigent persons were made. Id. at 806.
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ble purposes because it was created to sell drugs and thus competed
with profit-making enterprises. 275 The court stated the danger of pro-
viding too wide a health exemption: "Virtually everything we buy has
an effect, directly or indirectly, on our health. We do not believe that
the law requires that any organization whose purpose is to benefit
health, however remotely, is automatically entitled, without more, to
the desired exemption. ' 276 A vigorous dissent argued that the "courts
have defined 'charity' to be something more than mere alms-giving or
the relief of poverty and disease, and have given it a significance
broad enough to include practical enterprises for the good of human-
ity operated at a moderate cost to those who receive the benefits. ' 277
The dissent argued that the drugs were used in the prevention of
disease and illness and promoted health generally. 278 In the absence of
commercial purpose, these were said to be adequate grounds for tax
exemption 279
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Tax Court denial of
the exemption. 280 The court found that Federation made no accom-
odation for those unable to pay for their drugs and was therefore in
competition with for-profit pharmacies in the area. 21 The organiza-
275. 72 T.C. 687, 691-92 (1979). The Tax Court stressed that the Federation's
exclusive purpose for existence was to sell drugs, which is an activity normally carried
on as a profitmaking enterprise. Id.
276. Id. at 692. The original burden is on the taxpayer to prove that he falls
within the intent of the statute and in Federation, the court was not satisfied this had
been accomplished. Id. at 691. The dissent responded that the prescription drugs
were specifically applied to the mitigation of disease and illness: "If the sale of those
drugs does not directly and immediately promote health, nothings does." Id. at 695
(emphasis in original).
277. Id. at 695 (Tietjens, J., dissenting) (citing Young Men's Christian Ass'n v.
Lancaster County, 106 Neb. 105, 111, 182 N.W. 593, 595 (1921)). In YMCA the
court examined a petition for exempt status where the institution had not managed to
run at a profit for the preceding year. The court noted, "[r]eason and authority are
opposed to the proposition that an institution otherwise charitable will be deprived of
that character by the mere fact that charges for facilities and services are made to
individual members .. " 106 Neb. 105, 111, 182 N.W. 593, 595. Accord Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y v. County of Gage, 181 Neb. 831, 836, 151
N.W.2d 446, 449 (1967). The County challenged the charitable status of a nursing
home. The court analogized the nursing home to a hospital. Further, the court noted
that with the introduction of modern social programs and the decline of private gifts,
provision of free services is not the best standard for determining the status of
charitable organizations. Id.
278. 72 T.C. at 697 (Tietjens, J., dissenting).
279. Id. See note 264 supra (Rev. Rul. 69-545 relaxed previous standards for
determining charitable status).
280. 625 F.2d at 809.
281. Id.
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tion's provision of a discount for senior citizens belonging to the
Federation was insufficient to earn a charitable status. 282
The Fifth Circuit recently made a strict distinction regarding the
exempt status of hospital pharmacy sales. In Hi Plains Hospital v.
United States,283 the court found that pharmacy sales to non-hospital-
ized patients of doctors on the institution's staff did not generate
taxable income. The number of such transactions was limited and the
court said that such sales were necessary to attract doctors to the
hospital to enable it to fulfill a charitable purpose. 284 Sales by the
hospital pharmacy to the public, however, were taxable income de-
spite the fact that during most of the hospital's existence, its area of
service was not served by any other pharmacy. 28 5 The lower court
applied a restrictive analysis to Hi Plains' argument that its pharmacy
sales to the public were exempt, finding that the exemption would
operate only if the benefits "relate to the hospital. ' 28 6 The Fifth
Circuit remanded the case back to the lower court to determine if the
sales were minor and occasional and therefore exempt. 28 7 This limited
sales requirement, however, would preclude the hospital pharmacy
from offering any substantial community benefit to the public while
maintaining exempt status. Providing the benefit would be an exempt
activity only if it related directly to the operation of the hospital.
The Tax Court also has utilized a strict interpretation of "charita-
ble" activity in evaluating health service companies. Those companies
which include non-exempt organizations among their clients and
which compete with other commercial firms carry a heavy burden
when attempting to attain exempt status. In B.S. W. Group, Inc., 288
an organization was formed to provide consulting and research serv-
282. Id. at 806. See Medical Diagnostic Ass'n v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 610,
615-16 (1940) (medical laboratory providing services to physicians at cost with intent
that the physicians charge lower fees to indigent patients held not charitable).
283. 670 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1982).
284. Id. at 531-33.
285. Id. at 533. Generally, sales to nonpatients will generate unrelated trade or
business income because they are not related to the hospital. Id. See generally Lttr.
Rul. 8135016 (undated) (hospital testing of laboratory specimens taken at private
doctor's offices subject to patient/nonpatient distinction). An exception can be made
where the testing results in important contributions to the hospital's exempt purpose.
See generally Lttr. Rul. 8124006 (undated) (discussion of factors to be weighed,
including the needs of the community and hospital, degree of private benefit served
and level of competition with commercial laboratories). Private letter rulings may
not be cited as precedent. I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1976).
286. 670 F.2d at 533.
287. Id.
288. 70 T.C. 352 (1978).
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ices to exempt and non-exempt clients.2 89 The non-exempt clients
were, however, nonprofit organizations. 290 Although the general pol-
icy was to provide consulting services at or near cost, the fees provided
for a modest profit. 2 1 The Tax Court focused on the issue of whether
the organization was operated exclusively for an exempt purpose un-
der section 501(c)(3)29 2 and determined that it was not. 213 The court
noted that furnishing managerial services at cost is not an exempt
activity because it lacks any indication of donative intent. 294 Providing
the same services to exempt organizations at substantially below cost,
however, would have been a basis for an exemption. 29 5 In B.S. W., the
court also declared that it would have been "sympathetic" to B.S.W.'s
exemption request if the corporation had acted only to further exclu-
sively exempt purposes. 296 B.S.W., however, had acted as a conduit
linking individual researchers with both exempt and non-exempt cli-
ent organizations. 29 7 The court was concerned by the fact that com-
mercial firms did not participate in this field of consulting, but this
did not alter the court's conclusion.2 98 The fact that such businesses are
normally carried on for profit placed a burden on this petitioner to
show otherwise. 29 9
Under current I.R.S. and court determinations, for-profit alterna-
tive delivery systems cannot meet the qualification standards for ex-
empt status. The hospital tax exemption criteria which Sound Health
applies to HMOs and impliedly to other alternative delivery systems
will not accommodate many types of new health care providers.
Federation Pharmacy narrowed the exemption criteria further by
finding that a health care provider who offers lower cost services will
not qualify as a charitable organization even if significant discounts
are widespread in the community. B.S.W. illustrates that even a
modest profit will be fatal to an exemption application. These rulings
severely limit the range of tax exempt health care activities.
289. Id. at 354-55.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 355.
292. Id. at 353.
293. Id. at 360-61.
294. Id. at 356, quoting Rev. Rul. 72-369, 1972 C.B. 245. The I.R.S. stated that
such provision of services for a fee is a trade or business ordinarily carried on for
profit. Providing the services solely for exempt organizations does not overcome the
fact that the transaction lacks the donative intent needed to qualify as charitable.
Rev. Rul. 72-369, supra.
295. 70 T.C. at 356, citing Rev. Rul. 71-529, 1971-2 C.B. 234.
296. 70 T.C. at 359.
297. Id. This is not inherently charitable, educational or scientific activity. Id.
298. Id. at 361.
299. Id. at 358.
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VII. Tax Exempt Financing as a Component of the Market
Approach
The argument for broader tax exempt financing of health care
facilities is made against established criticism. 30 0 Nevertheless, it is a
300. Whether tax exempt financing should be available for any health care facili-
ties is a different question from whether only some types of providers should be
eligible for its use. This footnote will raise the issues relating to tax exempt financing
to benefit health care facilities generally.
Tax exempt financing has been criticized as an economically inefficient subsidy
and a misallocation of public funds. Each of these criticisms will be discussed.
Tax exempt financing has been described as economically inefficient because the
federal government essentially foregoes tax revenues in exchange for private lenders
demanding lower interest rates from the health providers. See Cabinet, The Munici-
pal Bond Interest Exception: Comments On A Running Battle, 24 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 64, 66 (1972) (referring to this exchange as a subsidy); see also D. COHODEs & B.
KINKEAD, HOSPITAL CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE 1980's-Is THFRE A CRISIS? 198-99
(August 1982) (the Senate Budget Committee estimated that each $1 of interest
savings to institutions using tax exempt hospital bonds cost the government $1.33 in
lost tax revenue).
To the extent that tax exempt financing may contribute to unnecessary construc-
tion and renovation of health facilities, it is economically inefficient. See Harris,
Eizenstat, Kahn, McIntyre, Press & Schultze, Memorandum to the President, April
24, 1980, reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. H4383-84 (daily ed. May 30, 1980) (an
estimated 130,000 excess beds contribute to $4 billion in unnecessary payments).
Members of the Carter Administration recommended a reduction in tax exempt
financing to reduce unneeded health facility expansion. Id. (proposing legislation to
subject tax exempt bond financings to more strenuous review). The Reagan Adminis-
tration has also considered restrictions on tax exempt revenue bonds for hospitals. See
D. COHODES & B. KINKEAD, supra, at 197-98 (discussion of the proposed Reagan
restrictions).
Opponents of tax exempt financing for health care also argue that the health care
industry will not respond to market conditions even if they can be created. See
Pollard, supra note 13, at 159 (this argument states that (1) medicine is too complex
for consumers to understand, (2) patients are too sick to evaluate alternatives and
performance and (3) in the health care industry, increased supply will stimulate
demand rather than reduce price).
In addition to noting economic inefficiencies created by tax exempt financing,
critics argue that it provides an improper benefit to private individuals. See note 21
supra (discussion of tax benefits to investor of the exemption). See also Kochan, Bond
Market Comment, Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Vol. 5 No. 50, Dec. 17,
1982, at 4 (in 1982, individuals purchased an estimated 90 % of new municipal bond
issues).
Supporters of tax exempt financing dispute both the economic inefficiency and
improper private benefit criticisms. First, they note that the tax exempt financing
process applies market scrutiny to proposed financings. See West, Efficiency of the
Securities Markets, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: SECURITIES, OPTIONS, Fu-
Turms 20-28 (1981) (discussion of operational and pricing efficiency of the market). If
a health care bond issuer were an unreasonable risk, market financing would result
in reduced demand for the debt instruments. See Fabrozzi, supra note 117, at 29-31
(discussion of the credit rating agencies and the role of ratings in determining the
marketability of bonds).
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reasonable option in light of the inability of the current health care
system to provide affordable medical services. Tax exempt financing
could be utilized to implement a competitive approach to health care
delivery by enabling alternative delivery systems to enter the health
market. 301
Health care in the United States is a sophisticated and capital
intensive industry. One recent hospital improvement and expansion
required the issuance of $228,260,000 of Hospital Improvement Reve-
nue Bonds. 302 Within the health care industry, some providers receive
government sponsored assistance in capital financing. Those health
providers which can qualify as nonprofit charitable facilities can issue
tax exempt revenue bonds through issuing authorities at interest rates
significantly lower than taxable bonds. 30 3 The lower financing cost of
Second, supporters of tax exempt hospital bonds dispute the charge that the bonds
have stimulated unneeded construction and renovation. HEALTH CARE FINANCING
STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 7-9 (noting the effect of inflation on the measure-
ments of actual bond financings and the declining percentage of hospital bonds as
part of the municipal bond market).
Third, the assumption that the health care system will not respond to economic
principles of supply and demand has been questioned. See Pollard, supra note 13, at
167 (stating that if the market mechanism works in other economic sectors, we
cannot assume that health care is different). See also C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 91,
at 3 (lack of experience with a competitive health care system precludes assumptions
about health care's ability to respond to a competitive market).
Finally, while tax exempt bonds do provide a private benefit for the investor, this
benefit represents congressional intent to encourage specific types of private activity.
The alternative is coercion or programs which tax and then return those revenues in
the form of grants. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (1976) (discussing 23 types of exempt organi-
zations including nonprofit cemetery companies and burial corporations. I.R.C. §
501(c)(13) (1976)). In addition, supporters of tax exempt financing argue that with-
out such financing, many hospitals would be excluded from the capital market,
possibly forcing closure. HEALTH CARE FINANCING STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at
21-24. See D. COHODES & B. KINKEAD, supra, at 28 (closures have the most impact on
the poor and elderly; financial problems account for 27% of all hospital closings).
301. See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text (discussion of different types of
alternative delivery systems).
302. STATE OF OHIO HOSPITAL IMPROVEMENT REVENUE BONDS (The Cleveland
Clinic Project), supra note 20. The funds will be used to construct a clinic building,
hospital wing, pedestrian link, and parking garage. In addition, the Project includes
site work including sewer, water, lighting, and landscaping, as well as acquisition of
major movable equipment for the Clinic Building and Hospital Wing. Id. at 19.
Even relatively small and specialized operations are capital intensive. Clinical labo-
ratories are one example. Such labs do tests that can be routine or sophisticated.
Industry participants have noted that market entry was once possible for $200,000
but now a single machine can cost in excess of $300,000. Such conditions and the
growing market for clinical laboratories have attracted large corporations with tech-
nology and resources. Many small labs cannot compete. Koenig, supra note 22.
303. Hospital Financings Through The Use Of Tax Exempt Securities 70 (1982)
(Law Journal Seminars Press Publication Number 751). The interest rate for tax
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exempt providers discourages those who are not exempt from using
taxable financings to enter the market. While a taxable provider may
be able to offer an actual medical service for lower cost, this advan-
tage would not be translated into lower fees. Any savings would be
significantly or totally neutralized by the taxable provider's higher
financing costs.3 °4 In sum, the nonprofit charitable health care pro-
viders have a competitive advantage in the tax laws. 30 5 The question is
whether it is a proper advantage.
If competitive opportunities were available, health care would be
an attractive market for for-profit enterprises. Under a Market Ap-
proach, alternative providers which balanced the needs of quality and
reasonable cost could achieve profits by eliminating inefficiencies as
well as by improving procedures and policies. 306 The current health
care system has strong inflationary tendencies which could be ex-
ploited in a competitive environment. 30 7 As a result of third party
payments, the individual consumer has been separated from his re-
sponsibility for his health care consumption decisions. At the same
exempt bonds has been 60 to 70% that of taxable bonds. Id. See notes 234-37 supra
and accompanying text. (For-profit facilities can utilize small issue industrial devel-
opment bonds, but these are limited to $1 million or in some cases $10 million).
304. See Areeda, Barriers to Entry, in P. AREEDA, supra note 167, 117, at 20.
Capital requirements can impede market entry when the volume of capital needed to
support entry is very high and/or the likelihood of obtaining the needed capital at
costs comparable to those of established providers is low.
305. Comment, Income Taxation-A Pauper A Day Keeps The Taxinan Away;
Qualification of Hospitals As Charitable Institutions Under Section 501(c)(3) of the
I.R.C. of 1954, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1195, 1214 (1976) (discussing restrictions on commer-
cial activities of charitable organizations).
306. A. SOMERS, supra note 135, at 11-13. Profit oriented businesses have observed
the rising percentage of health care expenditures in the Gross National Product and
have indicated interest in hospitals, health care industry hardware and hospital
computer use. Id.
The inefficiencies of the health care market are not subject to economic sanctions,
but rather rely on government administrative oversight. For example, a September
10. 1982 report from the Senate Special Committee on Aging described how pace-
makers costing $500 to $900 were sold to hospitals for $2,000 to $5,000. There were
additional kickbacks in some instances. The hospital then increased the price to
patients by 50 to 150%. Estimates that 30 to 50% of pacemaker implants are
unnecessary are significant because 150,000 persons will receive pacemakers in 1982.
The average cost will be $10,000 to $18,000 per operation and after-care period.
Pacemaker Prices Far Outpace Costs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 20, 1982, at
14. Under a Market Approach, this abuse would attract a surge of competitors who
could cut the cost drastically and still be profitable.
307. See note 4 supra (discussion of cost increases in health care and the CPI). See
also Areeda, Allocative Efficiency, in P. AREEDA, supra note 167, 116, at 18-19. In
economic terms, the government has granted an exclusive privilege to a distinct class
of health care providers. Not suprisingly, costs have risen. Id.
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time, third party payments through insurance and government pro-
grams have paid an increasing health care bill for large segments of
society. 30 8 These payors have had little success in controlling inflated
health care expenditures and are moving toward a new competitive
approach to health care delivery. 3 0
The need for granting tax exempt financing privileges to for-profit
health institutions is demonstrated by cases in which nonprofit hospi-
tal foundations and systems have tried to purchase investor owned
hospital systems. While nonprofit hospitals dominate the industry,
for-profit hospitals have had limited success 310 by introducing corpo-
rate management techniques and private sector executive talent. 31
Despite these management abilities, for-profit hospitals have been
absorbed by expanding nonprofit systems.31 2 To the extent that the
nonprofit's relative financial strength is a product of their tax exempt
status, it is not a fair competitive situation.
A. Development of the Charitable Tax Exemption
Encouraging competitive market forces by targeting tax exempt
financings to for-profit delivery systems would entail a break with
current tax policy. 313 There is precedent, however, for broadening the
charitable exemption as it applies to health care. 314 The I.R.S. origi-
nally insisted on provision of free care to all patients before a hospital
could qualify as charitable and tax exempt. 31 5 This position was re-
308. See notes 62-74 supra and accompanying text (discussion of the allocation of
health care expenditures).
309. See notes 133-62 supra and accompanying text (discussion of the Market
Approach and other pro-competitive theories).
310. See Table 53 and Table 58, supra note 34. In 1979 there were 867 proprietary
short-stay hospitals out of 6,525 facilities in the United States. In the same year, 75 of
560 long-stay hospitals were "propritary." Id.
311. Coyne, Nonprofit Hospital Groups Make A Move On Investor Owned Sys-
tems, MODERN HEALTH CARE, Nov. 1980, at 82.
312. Id.
313. See notes 224-27 supra and accompanying text (introductory discussion of
current tax policy).
314. Bromberg, Financing Health Care And The Effect Of The Tax Law, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 156, 162-68 (Autumn 1975) (broadening criteria discussed with
evaluation of trend); Comment, supra note 305, at 1201-06 (traces widening view of
charitable status).
315. Davis Hospital, Inc., 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 312 Dec. 14,456(M) (1945). In Davis,
the I.R.S. took the position that charitable status was lost if the exempt organization
charged those able to pay for the services rendered. Id. at 315. The Tax Court
disagreed, stating that the institution may charge fees to those who can afford them.
So long as "admission and treatment are not denied to those unable to pay, an
institution is classed as charitable." Id. at 315. See Commissioner v. Battle Creek,
Inc., 126 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942) (I.R.S. denied exemption under Revenue Act of
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jected by the courts. 316 Following this setback, the I.R.S. moved
toward the Relief of Poverty Approach. This Approach, as set forth in
Revenue Ruling 56-185, states that hospitals deserve a tax advantage if
they provide free care to indigents3 17 by operating "to the extent of
their financial ability for those not able to pay for the services ren-
dered and not exclusively for those that are able and expected to
pay. ' 318 While Revenue Ruling 56-185 was consistent with its histori-
cal roots, it was an "inadequate criteria" for evolving nonprofit hospi-
tals.
319
Revenue Ruling 69-545320 was the I.R.S. response to criticism of
Revenue Ruling 56-185. The new ruling adopted the Community
Benefit Theory. 32 This broader concept of charity viewed the promo-
tion of health as a charitable purpose in spite of the fact that indigents
were no longer guaranteed care in excess of an emergency room.
322
Revenue Ruling 69-545 was upheld as constitutional by the District
of Columbia Circuit Court in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization.32 3 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded to
the district court after finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 324 In
1934, § 101(6). The Board of Tax Appeals reversed and the circuit court affirmed,
holding that charges for those able to pay does not cause forfeiture of exempt status).
See also Comment, supra note 305, at 1201 (discussion of I.R.S. position denying
exemption to those who charged for services).
316. 126 F.2d at 406. It was held that charging those able to pay while offering
free care to indigents was classified as charitable, Id. at 405-06.
317. Bromberg, supra note 314, at 162 (discussion of the Relief of Poverty Ap-
proach); Comment, supra note 305, at 1201 (development of the Relief of Poverty
Approach in the context of historical evolution of different theories of exemption).
318. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (discussing criteria and tests to be met in
determining whether a hospital can qualify for exemption from income tax as a
public charitable organization).
319. Bromberg, supra note 314, at 162-63. Revenue Ruling 56-185 sought to link
the historical origin of hospitals as providers of free care to indigents with tax exempt
criteria of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 163. Rev. Rul. 56-185 was, however, an
uncertain guide to hospital tax exemptions because it was inconsistent with other
provisions of the Code. See id. (discussion of contradictions between Rev. Rul. 56-185
and I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) definition of charitable criteria).
320. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. See note 263 supra (discussion of Rev.
Rul. 69-545).
321. Bromberg, supra note 314, at 164. This new standard gave the hospital the
option of using the Rev. Rul. 56-185 standard (operate for those unable to pay to the
extent the hospital is financially able to do so), or the Rev. Rul. 69-545 standard
(benefit the community by treating all those who are able to pay directly or through
third party reimbursement as well as operate an emergency room open to all pa-
tients).
322. Rev. Rul. 69-545, supra note 320. Care exceeding emergency room treatment
is required only when the patient can pay for the service in some manner. Id.
323. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
324. 426 U.S. 26, 45-46 (1976).
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Simon, private citizens and welfare organizations claimed that Reve-
nue Ruling 69-545 operated contrary to congressional intent to pro-
vide free or reduced rate health services to the poor. 325 The District of
Columbia Circuit found that the Ruling operated within a permissible
definition of "charitable" and therefore was lawful. 32 6 The circuit
court noted, "the definition of the term charitable has never been
static and has broadened in recent years. ' 327 The court continued
with a strong affirmation of the evolving concept of charity:
While it is true that in the past Congress and the federal courts
have conditioned a hospital's charitable status on the level of free or
below cost care that it provided for indigents, there is no authority
for the conclusion that the determination of 'charitable' status was
always to be so limited. Such an inflexible construction fails to
recognize the changing economic, social and technological precepts
and values of contemporary society. In the field of health care, the
changes have been dramatic. 3
28
While not all views on the subject have been expansionist, 329 Revenue
Ruling 69-545 is an example of a once novel idea developing into a
view which has become firmly planted in the conception of fairness in
hospital tax exemptions.
Perhaps there is room for further development. For example, cer-
tain types of Health Maintenance Organizations may qualify for tax
exempt status under an expanded concept of charitable organizations.
In Sound Health Associates,330 the Tax Court approved specific as-
pects of the HMO's operation. 33' The court expressed particular ap-
325. 506 F.2d. at 1281.
326. Id. at 1287. The court noted, "[T]he question involved here ... is whether
the term 'charitable' as used in § 501(c)(3) may be broadly interpreted as was done in
Revenue Ruling 69-545 or is to be restricted to its narrow sense of relief of the poor.
We cannot conclude ... that Congress intended the latter construction." Id.
327. Id. at 1286.
328. Id. at 1287-88.
329. The Sixth Circuit took the view that even a ratio of uncompensated services
to total revenue of between 4.25 and 7.78%, while higher than many other exempt
hospitals, did not provide the basis for an exemption in all cases. Harding Hosp. Inc.
v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1077 (6th Cir. 1974). The facts of this case,
however, indicate that the hospital only treated as charitable cases those who had
been admitted as paying patients and who had exhausted their funds. Id. Further,
the court found a general failure to operate the hospital for charitable purposes. Id.
330. 71 T.C. 158. See note 264 supra (Commissioner acquiescence to Tax Court
decision).
331. 71 T.C. at 184. Favorable aspects included a research program, non-discrim-
ination in selecting physicians for staff privileges and designation of a board of
directors made up of prominent members of the community rather than persons
associated with the formation or administration of the facility. Id.
332. Id.
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proval of a fund established to receive contributions to subsidize the
membership fees of persons who could not afford the monthly pay-
ments. This fund was not mandated by Revenue Ruling 69-545 but
rather was an initiative by the HMO. 332 Such voluntary innovations
would be encouraged if they were rewarded by inclusion within the
charitable exemption.
B. A Proposal to Expand Tax Exempt Financing of Health Care
Facilities
A for-profit alternative delivery system could meet all the require-
ments of the current tax exemption except that "no profit inure to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual." 333 In order to justify
an exception to this policy for alternative health providers, two princi-
pal requirements must be addressed. First, such a policy must have a
compelling ideological basis and second, the policy must not be eco-
nomically wasteful.
The ideological basis of the proposal to allow targeted tax exempt
financing for alternative health providers is rooted in the concept of
fair and equal competition among all health providers. Such competi-
tion does not exist today because new market entrants are forced to
compete with established providers who obtained their physical plants
with the aid of government assistance.334 To continue a policy of
government sponsored monopoly when a legitimate competitive alter-
native is availiable is inconsistent with fundamental concepts of eco-
nornic fairness and efficiency expressed in the antitrust laws. 335 The
goal of implementing a competitive market approach in health care
provides sufficient ideological basis for considering a limited expan-
sion of tax exempt financing.
To remain consistent with the goal of initiating a competitive
health care market, the extension of tax exempt status must be limited
333. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
334. Examples of government assistance include the Hill-Burton Program, supra
note 6, and the supports available through tax exempt financing. While tax exempt
revenue bonds have become the leading financing technique, there are other methods
discussed at note 107 supra. Even Health Maintenance Organizations have received
government encouragement. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973
assisted in the establishment and expansion of HMOs. Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat.
914 (1973). The 1976 Amendments to the Act eased the requirements for HMOs to
receive federal support. Pub. L. No. 94-460, 90 Stat. 1945 (1976). The 1978 Amend-
ments extended the program for an additional three years. Pub. L. No. 95-559, 92
Stat. 2131; Pub. L. No. 96-32, § 2(a)-(c), 93 Stat. 82 (1978). HMOs have also begun
to use tax exempt financings. See notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text.
335. See note 167 supra (referral to the statutes which comprise the antitrust
laws).
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and temporary. 336 The assistance must be limited to providers without
great financial strength otherwise unable to enter the health care
market. In addition, the exemption must apply only to a period
reasonably calculated to assist the new provider in becoming firmly
rooted in the health care industry. At that point the ideological pur-
pose of equalizing market entry conditions will be fulfilled. 337
The second requirement which a proposal to expand tax exempt
financing must fulfill is that it must not be economically wasteful.
Initially, the proposal must reduce costs or it will not become a
practical policy alternative. 338 In addition, those not truly in need of
capital financing assistance must be discouraged from taking unfair
advantage of expanded tax exempt financing availability. Finally, the
total cost of the additional tax exempt financing to the taxpayer must
be justified. Each of these requirements will be discussed.
First, the encouragement of alternative delivery systems through
tax exempt financing does hold promise for cost reduction. Some
alternative providers are currently in place. Ambulatory surgical cen-
ters, home health providers, hospices for terminally ill persons and
birthing rooms are attempting to enter the health care market. 339
Health maintenance organizations have emerged as a significant force
in the delivery of health care. 340 HMOs have been able to achieve
336. Granting limited and temporary assistance to alternative providers is consist-
ent with the notion of gradual deregulation proposed by Market Approach theorists.
While the role of government in the health care market varies according to different
theories, it would not be eliminated. For example, Martin Feldstein favors a maxi-
mum liability risk insurance plan (MLRI) which gives consumers a direct financial
stake in efficient delivery of health care. He minimizes the government role.
Reinhardt, supra note 138, at 29. See also note 148 supra and accompanying text
(Blumstein and Sloan's view of the government role in a competitive market); see
note 151-52 supra and accompanying text (Professor Schramm's state statute confer-
ring wide powers over the health industry to a state commission); Pollard, supra note
13, at 158 (discussion of the Market Approach view that total or instant elimination
of regulation is not a practical policy).
337. The issue of meeting ongoing capital needs remains. Perhaps, additional
equalizing measures will be needed to provide for renovations and improvements.
The successful operation of the then "established" alternative providers may reduce
the need for continuing assistance. In addition, a provision similiar to I.R.C. §
103(b)(6) (small issues exemption) may be utilized to provide capital access for minor
projects.
338. See Reinhardt, supra note 138, at 31. Reinhardt, in discussing the idea of
entrepreneurship in health care, states that the perceived advantages of delegating
responsibility from dental or medical to paradental or paramedical personnel is
evaluated first on a strict cost savings basis. Without demonstrating that quality
delivery can be obtained for lower cost, the issue is predetermined. Id.
339. See notes 48-51 supra for a discussion of these alternative delivery systems.
340. See note 47 supra for a discussion of the growth of HMOs.
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significant cost savings and limited experience 34' with other alterna-
tive providers indicates that they can also achieve substantial cost
reductions. 34 2
The second requirement for expanded tax exempt financing is that
abuse of the tax exemption privilege must be prevented. This may be
accomplished by limiting the salary or investment return which ac-
crues to an employee, owner or investor during the period when an
alternative provider is using tax exempt financing. 343 This concept is
evident throughout both I.R.S. policy positions and court decisions.
Revenue Procedures 82-14 and 82-15 limit certain hospital employee
salaries to "reasonable" levels with provisions for controlled in-
creases.344 Court decisions have based grants of tax exempt status
under section 501(c)(3) on the premise that the granting of a "reason-
able" salary did not defeat the tax exempt status of an otherwise
exempt organization. 345 If the requirement of a "reasonable" salary
limitation is strictly enforced while the tax exempt financing is opera-
tive and then totally removed once the organization is no longer
utilizing the exemption, abuses of the support will be deterred and an
incentive to operate independently will be provided.
Third, a viable proposal to expand tax exempt financing must
justify its cost to the taxpayer. 346 Tax exempt financing has been
341. See note 45 supra for a discussion of savings achieved by HMOs.
342. See notes 48-51 supra for a discussion of savings achieved by alternative
delivery systems other than HMOs. Experimentation with alternative delivery sys-
tems in a Medicare and Medicaid context has also proved successful. Galblum &
Trieger, supra note 7, at 1. But other decisions within reimbursement programs
contribute to the competitive disadvantage of some alternative delivery systems. For
example, "emergicenters" have the goal of making primary care services accessible
during hours when physicians are not in their offices. For many emergicenter serv-
ices, the cost is half of the comparable hospital emergency room treatment. Yet the
development of such centers is being restricted because third party payors such as
Medicare have been slow to recognize emergicenters as legitimate health providers.
Michaels & Crouter, Emergicenters and the Need for a Competitive Regulatory
Approach, 10 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE No. 3, at 108 (1982).
343. See Tables 53 & 58, supra note 34. Hospitals are currently classified as either
(1) government-state or federal, (2) "propritary," or (3) nonprofit. Id. The use of tax
exempt financing'and the accompanying regulations for a limited period of time
would create a new category of for-profit health providers with temporary nonprofit
status during the period the provider was benefiting from the exempt financing.
344. Rev. Proc. 82-14, 1982-1 C.B. 459, Rev. Proc. 82-15, 1982-1 C.B. 460. In
these procedures the I.R.S. set forth conditions which, if met, would usually enable a
facility to avoid being found to be engaging in a trade or business as defined by §
103(b)(2)(A). See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(3) (1972) (discussion of the trade or
business test).
345. See note 266 supra (discussion of effect of paying a "reasonable salary").
346. See note 300 supra (tax exempt financing questioned on the basis of cost).
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criticized as an expensive subsidy. 347 It is not possible to know the cost
of providing tax exempt financing to alternative providers without
elaborate economic calculations based on projections of total financ-
ings offered under the program. This is not an insurmountable prob-
lem, however, 34 as it is possible to analyze some factors which reduce
the actual cost of any tax exempt financing proposal. Under the
government programs of Medicare and Medicaid, for example, pro-
viders are allowed to include apportionments of their capital costs in
bills to patients covered by the government programs.3 49 For providers
able to utilize the low rates of tax exempt financing, the interest
component of capital costs is decreased. This savings is reflected in
government reimbursements. Therefore, the cost of tax exempt fi-
nancing is reduced.35 0
The potential savings to government sponsored programs are rela-
tive to the size of the program. Medicare and Medicaid expenditures
exceeded $60 billion in 1980. 351 Even a small percentage net saving in
that expense would have profound benefits. To the extent that alter-
native providers can achieve large savings and a significant share of
the health care market, the government savings will be greater. 352
347. See note 300 supra (tax exempt financing as a subsidy).
348. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING STUDY GROUP, supra note 21 (a quantitative
assessment of the actual growth in the use of tax exempt financing from 1971-1981
and the various impacts of tax exempt bonds. The study examines the effects of tax
exempt financings on hospital costs, hospital financial conditions, hospital construc-
tion and the federal budget).
349. Gibson & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1980, in HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV., Sept. 1981, at 48 (Table 7A), cited in HEALTH CARE FINANCING
STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 30 n.27.
350. HEALTH CARE FINANCING STUDY GROUP, supra note 21, at 28. The effects of
this lower interest rate are evident when examining the hospital charge increases
necessary to pay the higher financing cost of taxable bonds. Id. at 19. If the tax
exempt hospital issues of 1979-1981 had been taxable issues, the additional interest
cost is estimated to have been $149 million in 1979, $189 million in 1980 and $128
million for the first six months of 1981. Id. at 28-29. Since Medicare and Medicaid
reimburse hospitals for approximately one-third of all expenses, the government
realized savings of about $50 million in 1979 and $63 million in 1980 due to the tax
exempt status of new hospital issues. Id. at 30. In addition, in 1980, savings on
reimbursement for annual interest charges due to previously issued tax exempt bonds
exceeded $150 million. Id.
351. Medicare expenditures and percent distribution ... 1967-80 (Table 75),
reprinted in HEALTH: UNITED STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 212; Medicaid expendi-
tures and percent distribution ... 1967-80 (Table 76), reprinted in HEALTH: UNITED
STATES 1981, supra note 27, at 213.
352. Lower reimbursement expenses for Medicare and Medicaid programs can be
achieved in two ways: (1) reduce the capital finance (interest) component of the
provider's fee by using tax exempt financing, supra note 350, or (2) utilize those
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Expanded availability of tax exempt financing would enable alter-
native delivery systems to enter the market and compete fairly with
nonprofit providers. The for-profit providers have an incentive to
improve the existing system to increase market share or profits. With-
out parity in market entry, they effectively will be excluded. Those
that do enter the market in spite of their weak competitive position
will have limited possibilities of success and will face constant expo-
sure to takeovers by nonprofit systems. 353 The price for excluding
competitive for-profit providers from the health care system is the
continuance of a system which experts charge rewards waste and
drains the nation's economy. 354
VIII. Conclusion
In the area of health care cost containment, pragmatic concerns
compel action. Health care costs have been rising for decades, but
they have assumed new significance as the health care share of the
Gross National Product approaches ten percent. Health care inflation
also has a ripple effect to the extent that it affects contracts and
government program benefits which tie automatic increases in prices,
wages or benefits to the Consumer Price Index.
A major political restructuring of the health care system in the
United States is unlikely. There are national issues of seemingly
greater significance which presently command our attention. There-
fore, the solution to the cost containment issue must come from within
the general fabric of the current system if it is to be enacted in the near
future. Widening the tax exemption for health care financing to stim-
ulate the development of a competitive health delivery system is such
an alternative.
Health care regulation has failed to control the surge of health care
expenditures. It is time for significant experimentation with the
widely supported alternative of the Market Approach. Tax exempt
financing is necessary to provide market access for the competitive
health care providers who will ultimately reduce health costs.
George A. King
providers who can charge the lowest price for the medical care component of the fee.
If alternative providers are lower priced, they should be used for the provision of
Medicare and Medicaid services.
353. See Coyne, supra note 311, at 82, 86 (discussing nonprofit takeovers of
investor owned systems).
354. See Stevens, supra note 7 (criticism of high medical costs).
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